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1. INTRODUCTION
The 2001 Report on United States Barriers to Trade and Investment is the seventeenth such
annual report. It has been compiled by the Market Access Unit of the Directorate General for
Trade in co-operation with the Delegation of the European Commission in Washington, D.C.,
on the basis of material available to the services of the European Commission. Its aim is to
provide an inventory of obstacles that EU exporters and investors encounter in the US.
This Report needs to be placed in the context of a transatlantic economic relationship which
has grown particularly strongly over the years, to the benefit of both economies, and which is
underpinned by the most extensive trade and investment links in the world.
The EU and the US are each others main trading partners (taking goods and services together)
and account for the largest bilateral trade relationship in the world. The total amount of 2-
way investment amounts to over €1.1 trillion, with each partner employing about 3 million
people in the other. In the year 1999, exports of EU goods to the US amounted to €182
billion (24.1% of total EU exports), while imports from the US amounted to €158 billion
(20.5% of total EU imports).
This Report must therefore be seen against the background of the joint commitment of the EU
and the US, in the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) and in the Transatlantic Economic
Partnership (TEP), to strengthen and consolidate the multilateral trading system, and to
progressively reduce or eliminate barriers that hinder the flow of goods, services and capital
between the EU and the US.
The fact remains that a considerable number of impediments, ranging from more traditional
tariff and non-tariff barriers, to differences in the legal and regulatory systems, or due to the
absence or limitation of internationally agreed rules and disciplines, still need to be tackled.
The Commission remains firmly committed to addressing these through the appropriate
channels (bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral) particularly as the reinforcement of efforts to
resolve bilateral trade issues and disputes is essential to the confidence-building process
w h i c hi sa ni n t e g r a lp a r to ft h eT E P .
The report should also be seen in the context of the broader policy initiative to improve access
to foreign markets for European exports. As part of this, the Commission has set up an
extensive electronic Market Access Database available to the public on the Internet
(http://mkaccdb.eu.int) (additional material on EU-US relations, as well as the Trade Barriers
Report itself is available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/us/intro/index.htm).
The Database provides market access information in the broadest sense, including economic
and regulatory information, tariff levels as well as analyses of trade issues. This facilitates
access throughout the year to online updates of the material contained in the published report
as well as to the additional background information that is included in the database.
It is to be hoped that, as a means of identifying problems of access to and of operating in US
markets, the Commission services’ Report will continue to play a useful role in focusing
dialogue and negotiations (both multilateral and bilateral) on the elimination of obstacles to
the free flow of trade and investment. The Report has taken into account developments until
the beginning of August 2001. Any comments should be addressed to the Market Access
Unit of the Directorate General for Trade, European Commission, 200 rue de la Loi, 1049
Brussels (fax: +32.2.296.73.93).2001 Report on US Barriers to Trade and Investment
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2. US TRADE POLICY: SUMMARY OF PROBLEM AREAS
The US Administration has stressed that its trade policy is based on the values of openness,
transparency and respect for the rule of law. These are principles to which the EU also firmly
subscribes. Both regard the WTO as a fundamental element in achieving a world of open
markets. Bilaterally, this shared commitment has contributed to the adoption of the NTA and
has fostered the development of a healthy economic relationship. But despite this reinforced
cooperation, there remain aspects of US trade policy which are sources of concern to the EU:-
Extraterritoriality
The EU strongly opposes the extraterritorial provisions of certain US legislation that hampers
international trade and investment by seeking to regulate EU trade with third countries
conducted by companies outside the US. Of particular concern are the Helms-Burton Act and
the Iran Libya Sanctions Act. Progress towards a lasting solution to this dispute was made at
the 18 May 1998 EU/US Summit. Implementation of the Understanding reached at that
occasion however, continues to depend on US Congress legislative action.
Unilateralism
Unilateralism in US trade legislation also remains a matter of concern. Whilst the US has in
practice made extensive use of the WTO dispute settlement system, it retains the opportunity
to take unilateral trade measures. In 2000 the EU won two dispute settlement cases before the
WTO, one against the suspension of customs liquidation in the banana dispute, and one
against Sections 301 to 310 of the US 1974 Trade Act. The EU has also initiated dispute
settlement proceedings against the “carousel” legislation signed into law on 18 May 2000
(section 407 of the Trade and Development Act of 2000) and the Byrd Amendment.
Tariff barriers
Tariffs have been substantially reduced in successive GATT rounds. As a result, the EU’s
concern is now focused on a relatively limited number of US “peaks” and other significant
tariffs where less progress has been made.
Other customs barriers
EU exports face a number of additional customs impediments, such as the customs user fees
and the excessive invoicing requirements on importers, which add to costs in a similar way to
tariffs. The EU is also very concerned about the discriminatory nature of the US Harbour
Maintenance Tax, and that a replacement scheme must not duplicate the WTO-incompatible
problems inherent in the current system.
Technical barriers to trade
EU exporters continue to face a number of behind-the-border impediments. The proliferation
of regulation at State level presents particular problems for companies without offices in the
US. In addition, some federal standards differ from international norms meaning that
manufacturers cannot directly export to the US products made to EU standards (normally
based on international standards). Other related difficulties concern labelling requirements
and excessive reliance on third-party certification. The FDA drug approval procedures
continue to give non-US based firms difficulties. In the agricultural area, a number of
sanitary and phytosanitary issues remain a significant source of difficulty for the EU. It was
expected that some of these issues might be solved by the Veterinary Equivalence Agreement,
signed on 20 July 1999, however no real progress has materialised so far.2001 Report on US Barriers to Trade and Investment
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Government procurement
Even before the Uruguay Round was ratified, the EU and US had concluded negotiations on a
further bilateral procurement agreement that improves on the provisions of the WTO
Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). These two agreements increased substantially the
bidding opportunities for the two sides. However, the EU remains concerned about the wide
variety of Buy America provisions that persist, and to which are being added others for
federally funded infrastructure programmes. Small business set-aside schemes also limit
bidding opportunities for EU contractors in a substantial manner. The EU also opposes sub-
federal selective purchasing legislation, restricting the ability of EU and other companies doing
business with specific countries to bid for contracts in various States and cities. Apart from
other actions, the EU considers that an increase in the coverage of the US GPA offer (and in
particular the elimination of the existing exceptions) would contribute to an improvement of
this situation. The review of the Government Procurement Agreement could, thus, represent
an opportunity to address the abovementioned problems.
National security restrictions
The principle of national security has a long tradition in trade policy but the lack of a clear
definition of “national security” has led to an overly wide interpretation of the term by the US
and the EU has repeatedly expressed concern about its excessive use by the US as a disguised
form of protectionism. This can be seen in relation to import, procurement and investment
restrictions, as well as the extraterritorial application of export restrictions. In particular, the
1988 Exon-Florio amendment and following legislation to restrain foreign investment in, or
ownership of, businesses relating to national security have proved to be problematic.
Trade defence instruments
In January 1999, after an investigation under the EC's Trade Barrier Regulation procedure, a
WTO Panel ruled that the 1916 US Antidumping Act is in contradiction with the WTO Anti-
dumping Agreement and GATT 1994. The WTO Appellate Body confirmed the Panel report
and the US was given until 26 July to implement the WTO decision. On 24 July, the US
asked the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) for an extension to this deadline. The EU has now
agreed that the draft bill, revoking the 1916 Act will be adopted (and any pending cases
terminated) by 31 December 2001 or the end of the current session of Congress (whichever is
sooner). On 10 May 2000, the WTO Appellate Body also condemned the countervailing
duties maintained after the arm’s length privatisation of British Steel, thereby rejecting the
methodology followed by the US Department of Commerce (DoC). The US refused to
implement the WTO ruling in 12 other privatisation cases and introduced a new methodology
which was no better than the one condemned by the Panel. Requests for a further WTO
Panel, together with WTO Panels on a DoC measure concerning de-minimus rates in sunset
reviews and US safeguard measures on steel wire rod and line pipe were made on 23 August
2001 but were blocked by the US. Second requests will be made on 10 September 2001.
Aeronautics industry
Despite the existence of the 1992 EC-US Large Civil Aircraft Agreement the EU remains
concerned about the level of indirect support to US aircraft manufacturers. This is also an
area for multilateral action, and progress needs to be made on the 1979 GATT Civil Aircraft
Agreement that remains stalled in the WTO because of the US' refusal to rectify it.
Shipbuilding
The 1994 OECD Shipbuilding Agreement which aims at regulating unfair practices, measures
of support and injurious pricing still cannot enter into force due to the absence of the US
ratification of the Agreement. The maintenance of a number of US subsidies, protective
legislation, and tax policies remain a matter of concern.2001 Report on US Barriers to Trade and Investment
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Conditional national treatment
The provision of conditional national treatment in various US laws, and notably in the area of
science and technology research remains troublesome.
Tax measures
Concerns about federal tax measures focus on the nature of reporting requirements and the
specific manner for calculating what is due. The EU deems State “world-wide” unitary taxes
as inconsistent with US obligations under its tax treaties with third countries. Foreign Sales
Corporations (FSC) legislation remains a matter of major concern, and the WTO Appellate
Body affirmed in a report of 24 February 2000 that the FSC is an illegal export subsidy and
incompatible with the WTO Subsidies Agreement and the Agreement on Agriculture. A
WTO Panel also struck down its replacement, the "FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial Income
Exclusion Act", in its Report of 20 August 2001. The EU is continuing to monitor the
situation closely.
Intellectual property
Despite a number of positive changes in US legislation following Uruguay Round
commitments, problems remain due to discrepancies between US legislation and other
international commitments. Issues such as informing right-holders of government use of
patents as well as various others related to appellations of origin, geographical indications,
copyright, trademarks and patent protection have not been resolved. The EC and its Member
States recently won a WTO dispute settlement case regarding obstacles to the licensing of music
works in the US (section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act), in which a deadline of 27 July was
set for the US to implement the panel’s recommendations. In July 2001, the DSB allowed the
US to extend this deadline until the end of the Congressional session and the EU and US began
to discuss ways in which performers and composers could be compensated for the losses
generated by the practice. The protection of trademarks in the US, notably those stemming
from Cuban origin, also raises concerns in respect of the compatibility with the TRIPs
Agreement. On 6 August 2001, a WTO Panel Report confirmed that Section 211 violated
WTO rules. Moreover, the co-existence of fundamentally different patent systems (US first-to-
invent system versus first-to-file system followed in the rest of the world) continues to create
considerable interface problems for EU companies, not to speak of the financial effects of high
administrative and litigation costs in patent matters.
Professional services
The implementation of the GATS schedules for professional services has resulted in some
improvement in market access. However, a number of problems, especially owing to
regulation at the State level, remain to be tackled in order to secure more transparent and open
access to the US market.
Communication services
The GATS Basic Telecommunications Agreement in force since February 1998 has led to
significant commitments on market access. Nonetheless, the EU remains concerned about the
considerable barriers that EU and foreign-owned firms wishing to get access to the US market
still face (e.g. investment restrictions, lengthy proceedings, conditionality of market access,
and reciprocity-based procedures). A good example is the current restrictions on access to the
satellite communications market in the US, though problems also exist in a number of other
areas. This situation is not in line with the open market access policy advocated by the US
and provides a competitive advantage to the significant number of US companies which have
already access to the European market in this field.
Air transport services
A number of issues continue to create problems including foreign ownership restrictions and
other protectionist regulations.
Maritime services2001 Report on US Barriers to Trade and Investment
7
Foreign-built vessels are prohibited from engaging in (direct or indirect) coastwise trade
(Jones Act), and cannot be documented and registered for dredging, towing or salvaging. In
addition, there has been no progress on the elimination of requirements that cargoes generated
by US Federal programmes are shipped on US-flagged ships.
3. EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND UNILATERALISM
3.1 Extraterritoriality
This is a long-standing feature of the US legal system manifesting itself in fields such as
environment, banking, taxes and export control. While the EU may share some of the
objectives underlying such laws, it is opposed, as a matter of law and principle, to the
extraterritorial application of such domestic legislation insofar as it purports to force persons
present in – and companies incorporated in - the EU to follow US laws or policies outside the
US and to the extent that it serves only to protect US trade or political interests. In particular,
the EU opposes the extraterritorial provisions of certain US legislation that hampers
international trade and investment by seeking to regulate EU trade with and investment in
third countries.
Helms-Burton Act
On 12 March 1996, President Clinton signed into law the Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996 (referred to as the “Helms-Burton Act”). This is the latest
in a series of legislative initiatives since the US proclaimed a trade embargo against Cuba in
1962 (Section 620 (a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961; further reinforced by the Food
Security Act of 1985 and the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992). The Helms-Burton Act inter
alia allows US citizens to file lawsuits for damages against foreign companies investing in
confiscated US (including Cuban-American) property in Cuba (Title III) and requires the US
Administration to refuse entry to the US to the key executives and shareholders of such
companies (Title IV). The EU is of the view that these measures are contrary to US
obligations under the WTO Agreements, in particular the GATT (General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade) and GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services).
Iran and Libya Sanctions Act
On 5 August 1996, the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (referred to as “ILSA”) was signed into
law. The legislation provides for mandatory sanctions against foreign companies that make
an investment above US$20 million contributing directly and significantly to the development
of petroleum or natural gas in Iran and Libya.
The EU has forcefully expressed, through a number of representations and démarches, its
opposition to this kind of legislation - or any secondary boycott and sanction legislation
having extraterritorial effects. In particular, with regard to the Helms-Burton Act, the EC and
its Member States had initiated a WTO dispute settlement procedure on 3 May 1996.
Furthermore, on 22 November 1996, the EU adopted Council Regulation 2271/96 (the so-
called "Blocking Statute") with a view to protecting the EU and its economic operators,
against the effects of extra-territorial legislation of this sort adopted by third countries. Other
trading partners of the US, such as Canada and Mexico, have strengthened or adopted similar
blocking legislation.2001 Report on US Barriers to Trade and Investment
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On 11 April 1997 an Understanding was reached with the US concerning the Helms-Burton
Act, and the ILSA as well as the EC’s WTO case regarding the former. The Understanding
charted a path towards a longer-term solution through the negotiation of international
disciplines and principles for greater protection of foreign investment, combined with the
amendment of the Helms-Burton Act. As regards ILSA the Understanding stipulated that
“the US will continue to work with the EU towards the objectives of meeting the terms”
under
the legislation which would permit the US President to waive the application of sanctions for
EU Member States and EU companies. The EU agreed to suspend its WTO case, but
reserved the right to restart or to re-launch the WTO dispute settlement procedure, if action is
taken against EU companies or individuals under the Helms-Burton Act or ILSA, or waivers
as described in the Understanding were not granted, or were withdrawn.
At the 18 May 1998 EU-US Summit in London, building upon the April 1997 Understanding,
the EU and the US reached an Understanding on a package of measures to resolve the dispute
regarding the Helms-Burton Act and ILSA. The Understanding offers the real prospect for a
permanent solution – but still depends on acceptance by the US Congress before full
implementation may take place. The Understanding contains three main elements.
The first element is the Understanding on investment disciplines. It contains a clear
commitment on the part of the US Administration to seek from Congress the authority to
grant a waiver from Title IV of the Helms-Burton Act (visa restrictions) without delay. With
respect to Title III (submission of law suits against “trafficking in expropriated property”) of
the Helms-Burton Act, the Understanding provides for a US commitment to continue to
waive the right to file law-suits, so far done on a six-monthly basis and to obtain such a
waiver on a permanent basis. It also addresses the issue of whether or not EU and US
investment assistance agencies should give assistance to investment projects in illegally
expropriated property. However, the EU will not apply the disciplines until the waiver
authority is applied.
The second element is the Transatlantic Partnership on Political Co-operation (TPPC) which
should be seen in conjunction with the EU’s efforts vis-à-vis US Administration to restrain its
use of unilateral sanctions with extraterritorial effects, so-called “secondary boycotts”. The
TPPC states that the US Administration will “not seek or propose, and will resist, the passage
of” such sanctions legislation.
The last element of the Understanding relates to the ILSA. At the London Summit, the US
Administration did not grant the EU a multilateral regime waiver as foreseen by the
Understanding of 11 April 1997. However, the US determined, under Section 9(c) of ILSA, to
waive the imposition of sanctions against a major EU investment project in gas exploration in
the South Pars field in Iran and committed that similar cases could be expected to be granted
similar waivers. As regards Libya, prospects for waivers were linked to further bilateral
dialogue. ILSA was due to expire on 5 August 2001, but legislation was introduced and passed
in the US Congress and signed into law by President Bush on 3 August 2001 (PL 107-24)
extending ILSA for another period of 5 years. The EU stated its objections to Congress and the
US Administration.
The Understanding reached at the Summit in no way softens the EU’s position that the Helms-
Burton and ILSA Acts are contrary to international law. The EU never acknowledged the
legitimacy of these Acts and fully reserved its right to resume the WTO case against the Helms-
Burton Act in the event of action being taken against EU persons or companies under either this
Act or ILSA or the waivers not materialising. The Understanding is of a political nature and
does not in any way lend any sort of validity to the illegal provisions of the US laws in question.
Full implementation depends on Congressional support, which despite the US
Administration's attempts to deliver appears not to be forthcoming. The EU and its Member
States can only fulfil the European commitments once the Presidential waiver authority under2001 Report on US Barriers to Trade and Investment
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Title IV of the Helms-Burton Act has been adopted and exercised. In the meantime, the US
Administration continues to investigate certain EU company’s investments in Cuba.
Iran Non-Proliferation Act
On 14 March 2000, the Iran Non-Proliferation Act (INPA) was signed into law. It provides
for discretionary sanctions against foreign companies transferring to Iran goods, services and
technology listed under the international export control regimes, as well as any other item
prohibited for export to Iran under US export control regulations, as potentially contributing
to the development of weapons of mass destruction.
INPA constitutes new extraterritorial legislation, for on the one hand, it allows the US
Administration to apply its own sanctions to exports which are subject to EU Member State
and EC export control regimes, while on the other hand, it unilaterally expands the scope of
export controls on EU exports beyond those multilaterally agreed upon. Its adoption is
incompatible with the US commitment under the TPPC to resist the passage of extraterritorial
sanction legislation.
EU concerns were repeatedly expressed in the run-up to the adoption of this Act. Taking
these into account, then President Clinton issued a statement when signing the Bill into law,
undertaking to work with Congress in order to seek to rationalise the reporting requirements
on transfers deemed legal under the applicable foreign laws and consistent with the
multilateral export control regimes. The EU expects that the new US Administration will take
the appropriate steps to repeal the threat of sanctions against EU entities.
Several other instances and variations of US extra-territoriality can be found in, inter alia,
various environmentally-driven embargoes (see section on import prohibitions), export
control legislation (see section on export restrictions) as well as, at the sub-federal level,
selective purchasing laws (see section on government procurement).
3.2 Unilateralism
This takes the form of either unilateral sanctions or retaliatory measures against “offending”
countries, or companies. These measures are based on an exclusive US appreciation of the
trade-related behaviour of a foreign country or its legislation and administrative practice,
without reference to, and sometimes in defiance of, multilaterally agreed rules. This approach
casts doubt on US support for a multilateral rules-based system of addressing trade problems
and can lead also to bilateral agreements with elements of discrimination.
The “Section 301” family of legislation provides a striking example of unilateral trade
legislation that has been used on numerous occasions against the EU. Section 301 of the 1974
Trade Act as amended by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 authorises the
US Government to take action to enforce US rights under any trade agreement and to combat
those practices by foreign governments which the US Government deems to be
discriminatory or unjustifiable and restricts US commerce.
The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 also introduced the so-called “Super
301” provision, a special initiation procedure for unfair foreign trade practice investigations
following the Section 301 procedure. Originally limited to 1989 and 1990, President Clinton
issued an Executive Order on Identification of Trade Expansion Priorities on 3 March 1994.
Referring to the lapsed Super 301 provision, the Executive Order requires the USTR, on the
basis of the information contained in the annual National Trade Estimates Report to identify
“priority” unfair trade practices from “priority” countries and self-initiate Section 301 cases
against them. On 27 September 1995, the President amended this Executive Order to extend it
to calendar years 1996 and 1997. After a lapse of more than one year, President Clinton
renewed Super 301 by Executive Order in March 1999, extending it until the end of 2001. In
addition, Title VII of the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act relating to the removal2001 Report on US Barriers to Trade and Investment
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of government procurement barriers was renewed. Rather than identify any countries under
Title VII for formal identification, USTR intends to monitor countries and cases with the
potential for future identification. On 1 May 2001, USTR announced significant progress in
resolving Germany’s so-called “sect-filter” purchasing restrictions.
Furthermore, the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act introduced a “Special 301”
procedure targeting intellectual property rights protection outside the US. Under Special 301
the USTR has created a “priority watch list” and “watch list” to identify “priority” foreign
countries that are deemed to deny adequate and effective protection of intellectual property
rights. Countries placed on the “priority watch list” are the focus of increased bilateral
attention and USTR officially initiates investigation procedures that may eventually result in
unilateral trade measures. The “watch list” is reserved for those countries that do not protect
US intellectual property or that deny market access to IPR-related industries. On 1 May
2001, the EU was placed on the 2001 “priority watch list” concerning EU Regulation 2081/92
governing the protection of geographical indications for agriculture products and foodstuffs.
Furthermore, Greece, and Italy were placed on the “watch list”.
Admittedly, the US has used its unilateral trade policy arsenal more sparingly since the WTO
Agreement entered into force on 1 January 1995. This Agreement provides for multilateral
disciplines on a much-expanded range of economic activities (eg. services, textile and clothing,
agriculture and intellectual property – TRIPS). It also establishes a much more effective dispute
settlement system, which, in particular, makes it impossible for the losing party to block
adoption of the panel report or authorisation of suspension of concessions. The counter-part to
this is that the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) explicitly obliges parties to follow the
multilateral dispute settlement procedures and to refrain from unilateral determinations of non-
conformity and unilateral sanctions.
Nevertheless, on issues covered by the WTO, the US has, on several occasions resorted to
unilateral action. In the bananas and beef-hormones cases, in order to comply with the time
limits imposed by the Section 301 legislation, the US did not use the obligatory procedure
provided by the DSU to solve its disagreement with the EU over whether the EU was in
conformity with WTO rules. Instead, the US directly requested the WTO to authorise it to
suspend concessions against the EC, in violation of normal WTO procedures.
The EU, in full compliance with WTO rules, initiated two dispute settlement actions before
the WTO, one against the US suspension of tariff concessions and one against Sections 301 to
310 of the 1974 Trade Act. The reason for challenging the legislation itself is that this
legislation mandates USTR to take this kind of unilateral action within time frames that in
certain cases cannot possibly comply with WTO rules. This is particularly relevant in cases
where the US should follow the procedure of Article 21.5 DSU to resolve disagreements over
the WTO compatibility of measures taken by other Members to implement panel rulings.
A WTO Panel ruled on 8 November 1999 that the statutory language of Sections 301 to 310
of the 1974 Trade Act was as such inconsistent with the rules of the WTO DSU. However,
because the US administration through a Statement of administrative Action had undertaken
to always act in a manner consistent with the US obligations under the WTO, the panel
concluded that as long as the undertaking was respected, no violation was taking place. The
practical result of this ruling has been to make Sections 301-310 ineffective against WTO
members.
Furthermore, the “carousel” legislation, enacted on 18 May 2000 (Section 407 of the Trade
and Development Act of 2000), provides for a mandatory and unilateral revision of the list of
products subject to suspension of GATT concessions 120 days after the application of the first
suspension and then every 180 days thereafter, in order to affect imports from Members
which have been determined by the US not to have implemented recommendations made
pursuant to a WTO dispute settlement proceeding. The EU believes that such legislation is
fundamentally at odds with the basic principles of the DSU and has issued dispute settlement
proceedings.2001 Report on US Barriers to Trade and Investment
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In addition, in cases where bilateral (as opposed to WTO) agreements are alleged to have
been violated, Section 301 is still regularly used as a unilateral trade policy instrument.
Under the various elements of Section 301 legislation, trading partners are given no choice
but to negotiate on the basis of an agenda set by the US, on the basis of judgements,
perceptions, timetables, and indeed, US legislation.
4. TARIFF BARRIERS
4.1 Applied Tariff Barriers
Tariff peaks
Despite the substantial tariff reduction and elimination agreed in the Uruguay Round, the US
retains a number of significant duties and tariff peaks in various sectors including food
products, textiles, footwear, leather goods, jewellery and costume jewellery, ceramics, glass,
trucks and railway cars.
The Information Technology Agreement
With regard to information technology (IT) products, the Information Technology Agreement
(ITA) providing for the complete elimination of tariffs by the year 2000 on a large number of
products was implemented as of July 1997. The main elements of the new US tariff structure
eliminate tariffs on all semiconductors, computers, computer peripherals and computer parts,
electronic calculators, telecommunication equipment, electronic components (capacitors,
resistors, printed circuits), semiconductor testing and manufacturing equipment and certain
consumer electronic items. Although tariffs on optical fibre cables were eliminated under the
ITA, the US refused to do the same for optical fibres on which they maintain a rather
substantial protection. Tubes for computer monitors are excluded also. Attempts to broaden
the scope and coverage of products of the ITA in the form of the ITA II have so far failed.
Banana dispute
A WTO ruling on 6 April 1999, found that various elements of the EU’s revised banana import
regime, which came into force on 1 January 1999, were inconsistent with WTO rules.
The EU upholds the importance of abiding by WTO rules, and so, on 29 January 2001 the
Council adopted a new regulation (216/2001) amending Regulation 404/93, which puts the EU
in conformity with WTO rules. In parallel and following these intense consultations, the EU
and the US brokered an Understanding by which we mutually agreed on a solution that would
definitely put an end to this long-standing dispute.
With the entry into force of the new EU legislation, as of 1 July 2001, the US lifted the
retaliatory duties on US$191.4 million worth of EU products.2001 Report on US Barriers to Trade and Investment
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Beef Hormones dispute
The decision by a WTO panel of August 1997 that EC measures against hormones in beef
were not in compliance with WTO rules was submitted to the Appellate Body in September
1997. The body overruled the earlier panel but recommended that the EC bring its measures
into conformity with obligations under the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures (SPS).
Following the deadline of 13 May 1999 imposed by the Arbitrator for the EU to implement
those recommendations and request by the US to the WTO DSB to allow the suspension of
tariff concessions to the EC and its Member States, the WTO Arbitrator determined that the
level of impairment suffered by the US was $116.8 million. In reaction to this, the US
suspended the application of tariff concessions by imposing a 100% ad valorem rate of duty
on a list of mainly agricultural products from 29 July 1999 onward.
While these sanctions remain, the EU and US are engaged in consultations to find a solution
in the form of compensation for imports into the EU of US non hormone-treated beef.
Ceramics and Glass
At the end of the Uruguay Round, customs duties on ceramics and glass products remain
relatively higher in the US than in Europe. During the Uruguay Round the US rejected the
Community’s offer to abolish tariffs in this sector, even though Mexico, one of Europe’s
leading competitors in the US market, should, after a transitional period, enjoy a zero rate by
virtue of the NAFTA. There are products of importance for EU trade which will continue to
be confronted by high tariffs even when the Uruguay Round reductions have been fully
implemented. These include hotel and restaurant ware, on which the duty rates currently are
30% if made of porcelain or china and 31.5% for others, and certain drinking glasses and
other glassware on which the duty rates currently are 33.2% and 38% respectively.
Textiles and Leather
The average trade weighted reduction made by the US in the Uruguay Round was only 12%
for textiles and clothing (to be implemented over ten years) and 5.2% for footwear. This
means that many significant tariffs and tariff peaks will remain on products of export interest
to the EU even when the Uruguay Round reductions have been implemented fully. These
include certain woollen fabrics and articles of apparel for which the current duty rates are
31.5% plus a specific rate and 33.3% respectively.
Jewellery
The US jewellery sector is protected by an average tariff of 6% with the highest post Uruguay
Round tariff being 13.5%. The corresponding EU rates stand between 2.5% and 3%.
Furthermore, the US maintains very significant import duties on certain semi-finished
products made of precious metals. The very high raw material cost in this sector means that
even modest tariff barriers reduce significantly the access of EU jewellery to the US market.
Automotive
Recently, a customs duty of 25% has been placed on vehicles for the transport of goods with a
weight greater than 5 tonnes but less than 20 tonnes.
4.2 Tariff Quotas
Agriculture and Fisheries
The import of certain agricultural products into the US takes place mainly under WTO bound
tariff quotas. The EU is monitoring closely the management of such quotas.
The EU remains concerned about certain in-built rigidities in the import licensing system for
dairy products. This is in part based on historical trading and sometimes even results in2001 Report on US Barriers to Trade and Investment
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licences being awarded to companies who no longer trade in milk products. The division of
quotas for certain cheeses into Tokyo Round quantities and Uruguay Round quantities, which
has no other purpose other than to fragment access to and complicate license applications by
traders, should be eliminated. This amalgamation is particularly needed for Swiss or
Emmenthal type cheeses and for the NSPF (not specifically provided for) group. A single
quota for each cheese group would be more transparent, comprehensible and accessible.
Furthermore, a recent study by the US Department of Agriculture’s (USDA's) Economic
Research Service (April 2001) has actually identified inefficiencies in this type of quota
administration.
5. NON-TARIFF BARRIERS
5.1 Registration, Documentation, Customs Procedures
Excessive invoice requirements
Invoice requirements for exporting certain products to the US can be excessive. The
information requirements far exceed normal customs declaration and tariff procedures. They
are unnecessary because US Customs are entitled to ask for all necessary supplementary
documents and information during clearance (as provided for by the Kyoto Convention).
There should be no systematic demand for this kind of information. These formalities are
also burdensome and costly, thus constituting a barrier against new entrants and small
companies. As a result, large established suppliers are privileged and small and new
competitors disadvantaged. These effects are particularly disruptive in diversified high-value
and small-quantity markets that are of special relevance for the EU.
EU Origin
US Customs does not recognise the EC as a country of origin and refuses to accept EC
certificates of origin. This means that in order to justify EC country of origin status, EU firms
are required to furnish supplementary documentation and follow further procedures, which
can be a source of additional costs. The Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD) has urged
the US to recognise a simple EU origin. US Customs noted this issue extends the scope of
customs policy and that inter-agency consensus did not yet exist (due in part to resistance
from USTR). Some US industries and organised labour opposed the change while other
business had cost concerns (ie. marketing). For example, tyres imported into the US are
required by law to be labelled with their country of origin. If tyres marked "made in the EC"
were accepted, market access would be improved and trade less onerous.
Textiles and Leather
Customs formalities for imports of textiles, clothing and footwear to the US require the
provision of particularly detailed and voluminous information. These requirements lead to2001 Report on US Barriers to Trade and Investment
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additional costs and in some cases include confidential processing methods (type of finishing,
of dyeing, etc.). Much of this information would appear to be irrelevant for customs or
statistical purposes. For example, for garments with an outer shell of more than one
construction or material, it is necessary to give the relative weight, percentage values and
surface area of each component; for outer shell components which are blends of different
materials, it is also necessary to include the relative weights of each component material.
The extension of the liquidation period up to 210 days also functions as an important trade
barrier. Apparel articles often have a short life span (e.g. fashion items must be sold within 2
to 3 months) and therefore have to be marketed immediately. Consequently, the retailer or the
importer is often not in a position to re-deliver the goods upon Customs request, in which case
Customs apply a high penalty (100% of the value of the goods). According to importers,
Customs may extend the liquidation period beyond 210 days without giving a detailed
motivation. In some cases a minor problem or error in invoice is sufficient. In addition,
during the liquidation period, Customs may still request any additional information necessary
to establish the classification and the country of origin.
Fisheries
The US has introduced a compulsory system of certificates of origin for yellowfin tuna caught
in the Eastern Tropical Pacific since July 1992. Certification rules are also applied for
countries using large-scale trawl nets.
The US Code, Title 46, Shipping, Section 12108, blocks the potentially interesting possibility
for EU fishermen to fish in US waters under a US flag since foreign-built US flag vessels
cannot be documented with a fishery endorsement, thereby also preventing the possibility of
joint ventures and joint enterprises. The American Fisheries Act of 1998 included a provision
that increased the percentage of shares in a vessel that must be held by US citizens in order
for the vessel to be considered a US vessel from 50% to 75%.
5.2 State Level Impediments to Trade
Wines and Spirits
The US operates a series of protectionist and monopolistic systems at State level for the
distribution and marketing of wines and spirits. While some legislation has its origins in
prohibition era restrictions, it has not been repealed and impedes the free circulation of
alcoholic beverages. Rules still persist in some States that do the following: prevent cross-
state retail sales of wines and spirits, prohibit EU exporters from distributing, rebottling, or
retailing their own wine and require duplicate label approvals, and other procedures. The
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) charges a fee for approval of wine labels
without which wine cannot be imported. While it is argued that cost recovery justifies the
ATF fee, there is no excuse for subsequent levies by various states. Furthermore, US wine
sold in its state of origin is not subject to the ATF procedure or fee.
User Fees
There is a series of user fees by which the user of a particular (formerly free) service pays an
amount presumed to cover the cost of the service provided.
As a result of laws enacted in 1985 and 1986, the US imposes user fees on the arrival of
merchandise, vessels, trucks, trains, private boats and planes, as well as passengers. The
Customs and Trade Act of 1990 and the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990
modified these provisions by, among other things, considerably increasing the level of the
fees. Excessive fees levied for customs, harbour and other arrival facilities (facilities mainly
used by importers) place foreign products at a disadvantage vis-à-vis US competition.2001 Report on US Barriers to Trade and Investment
15
The most significant of the customs user fees is the Merchandise Processing Fee (MPF). The
MPF is levied on all imported merchandise except for products from the least developed
countries, from eligible countries under the Caribbean Basin Recovery Act and the Andean
Trade Preference Act, and from US offshore possessions. It is levied also on merchandise
entered under Schedule 8, Special Classifications, of the Tariff Schedules of the US. Fixed
previously at 0.17% of the value of the imported goods, the MPF rose to 0.19% in 1992 and
amounts to 0.21% ad valorem on formal entries with a maximum of US$485 as from 1
January 1995. Whilst the MPF was to last until 30 September 1990 when established, it is
now set to run until 30 September 2003.
At the request of Canada and the EU, the GATT Council instituted a Panel in November 1987
that stated that the US Customs user fees for merchandise processing were not in conformity
with the General Agreement. The Panel ruled that customs user fees should reflect the
approximate cost of customs processing for the individual entry in question. This principle
was not met by an ad valorem system such as that used by the US. The GATT Council
adopted the Panel report in February 1988.
The present customs user fee structure is somewhat more equitable, since the fixing of a
ceiling makes it less onerous for high-value consignments. However, the fee is still likely to
exceed the cost of the service since it is still based on the value of the imported goods.
Harbour Maintenance Tax and Harbour Services Fee
US Customs also participates in the collection of the Harbour Maintenance Tax (HMT). The
HMT is levied in all US ports on waterborne imports, at an ad valorem rate of 0.125%.
Collected monies are transferred to the Harbour Maintenance Trust Fund to provide for the
operation and maintenance of channels and harbours. However, the ad valorem basis for the
HMT collection makes it difficult to justify as a fee approximating the cost of the service
provided. Moreover, there is a significant accumulation of unused funds, which reached
US$1.609 billion in FY1999 and is projected to rise even further. This points to the excessive
nature of the HMT.
The US Court of International Trade in October 1995 ruled that under US law the HMT is a
tax and not a user fee. The US Constitution prohibits taxes on exports. The US Court of
Appeals confirmed this ruling in June 1997 as did the US Supreme Court in March 1998. As
a result, the US authorities have stopped collecting HMT on exports. However, the HMT is
still being collected on imports.
In March 1998, the EU requested WTO dispute settlement consultations to challenge the
imposition of HMT on imports. Two rounds of consultations were held in Geneva on 25
March and 10 June 1998. On 30 April 1999, the Clinton Administration introduced a bill to
replace the HMT with a new Harbour Services Fee (HSF), H.R.1947. This new fee would not
only finance port operation and maintenance, as the HMT did, but also new port construction,
for a total amount of US$1 billion per year. The full costs of those activities, which benefit
the entire US economy, would have to be borne by a small group of economic operators,
namely shipping lines. In legal terms, the proposed legislation would duplicate many of the
WTO problems inherent in the HMT. Most importantly, the so-called “fee” would still be a
tax rather than a true user fee, since the charges would not be directly and proportionately
related to any true service provided in each individual instance to a vessel and the goods it
carries. This is clear, for instance, from the fact that:
- fixed rates are charged for all port visits in the US, whether or not the port in question needs
port maintenance or new port construction;
- container ships are significantly overcharged compared to, for instance bulk ships, noting
that imports use a proportionately higher share of container ships than US domestic shipments
and exports;
- many exemptions exist for different kinds of US vessels and for shipments between the US
mainland and Alaska, Hawaii and US possessions.2001 Report on US Barriers to Trade and Investment
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The EU therefore did not support adoption by Congress of H.R.1947 and urges the new
Administration to seek a solution that heeds the concerns expressed above.
Shipbuilding
The US applies a 50% ad valorem tax on non-emergency repairs of US owned ships outside
the US and on imported equipment for boats, including fishnets on the basis of Section 466 of
the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended in 1971 and 1990. Under the latter amendment the tax
would not apply, under certain conditions, to foreign repairs of “LASH” (Lighter Aboard
Ship) barges and spare vessel repair parts or materials. The implementing legislation of the
OECD Shipbuilding Agreement should make appropriate provision for abolition of this tax as
applicable to the contracting parties of the Shipbuilding Agreement (not yet entered into
force).
Automotive
The US levies the following three taxes/charges on the sales of cars in the US that raise
concern to European automakers: the Luxury Tax, the Corporate Average Fuel Economy
(CAFE) payment and the so-called Gas Guzzler Tax.
The Luxury Tax is an excise tax imposed since 1990 on cars valued above an arbitrary
threshold, currently around US$36,000. The tax has a higher incidence on imported cars than
on US produced cars. Originally it also applied to leisure boats and jewellery but these items
were later exempted due to pressure from US producers. The luxury tax is scheduled to be
eliminated in 2003, with the tax levied falling from 4% in 2001 to 3% in 2002.
The CAFE payment is a civil penalty payment levied on a manufacturer or importer whose
range of models has an average fuel efficiency below a certain level, currently 27.5 miles per
gallon (mpg). CAFE favours large integrated automakers or producers of small cars rather
than those who concentrate on the top end of the car market, such as importers of European
cars.
The so-called Gas Guzzler Tax is an excise tax of US$1,000 - 7,700 per car, levied on all cars
not meeting fuel economy standards set by the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
currently 22.5 mpg. This fuel economy cut-off point is not founded on any reasonable or
objective criterion and leads to discrimination against imported cars.
European automakers, with a total market share in the US of only 6%, bear nearly 70% of the
revenue generated by the luxury tax, 85% of that by the Gas Guzzler tax and almost 100% of the
CAFE penalties.
5.3 Import Prohibitions
The right of sovereign nations to take measures to protect their essential national security
interests has been widely recognised by multilateral and bilateral trade agreements. However,
it is in the interest of all trade partners that such measures are prudently and sparingly applied.
Restrictions to trade and investment cannot be justified on national security grounds if they
are, in reality, essentially protectionist in nature and serve other purposes.
National Security based restrictions
Under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, US industry can petition for the
restriction of imports from third countries on the grounds of national security. Protective
measures can be used for an unlimited period of time. The Department of Commerce (DoC)
investigates the effects of imports that threaten to impair national security either by quantity
or by circumstances. Section 232 is supposed to safeguard US national security, not the
economic welfare of any company, except when that company’s future may affect US2001 Report on US Barriers to Trade and Investment
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national security. The application of Section 232 is not dependent on proof of injury to US
industry.
In the past, the EU has voiced its concern that Section 232 gives US manufacturers an
opportunity to seek protection on grounds of national security, when in reality the aim is
simply to curb foreign competition. On 1 February 2001, the DoC initiated an investigation
to determine the effects on national security of imports of iron ore and semi-finished steel.
Agriculture and Fisheries
The Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (MMPA) aims at protecting marine mammals,
particularly dolphins, by progressively reducing the acceptable level of dolphin mortality in
US tuna-fishing operations in the Eastern Tropical Pacific (ETP) Ocean and providing for
sanctions to be taken against other countries which fail to apply similar standards.
The MMPA requires that countries that wish to import from the ETP must receive an
"affirmative finding" from the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS). The criteria for
receiving an "affirmative finding" relate to the membership (or launching and completing the
accession within six months) to the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) and
the need to have a "tuna tracking and verification system" that conforms to the Tuna Tracking
and Verification System adopted under the Agreement for International Dolphin Conservation
Programme (AIDCP).
The EU is provisionally applying AIDCP and is in the course of introducing the legislation
regarding a tuna tracking and verification system. The EU has requested to become party to
the IATTC but this is pending the signature and ratification by all parties to the Agreement of
a protocol to the agreement that would allow the Commission to join the IATTC. However,
this has taken longer than the six months foreseen in the US legislation due to reasons beyond
the control of the EU. Therefore, as the EU has not met the requirement of membership to the
IATTC, nor has in force a tuna tracking and verification system, it cannot receive an
"affirmative finding" to enable it to import tuna products from the ETP into the US.
Pursuant to section 609 of Public Law 101-162 exports of shrimp to the US will be
embargoed unless nations can provide evidence that their shrimp trawlers match US efforts to
protect sea turtles (artisanal fishing, having a sea turtle excluder program or fishing for cold-
water shrimp only). The US authorities have now certified forty-two nations, but five
Member States (France, Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece) have not been certified. Thailand,
Malaysia, Pakistan and India requested the establishment of a WTO Panel (January-February
1997). The EU participated as a third party.
The Appellate Body of the WTO to some degree reversed the findings of the Panel by
agreeing that the US measure served an environmental objective recognised as legitimate
under GATT Art. XX(g), the measure had been applied by the US in a manner that constitutes
an arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination between members of the WTO where the same
conditions prevail. The Appellate Body further stressed that the US should have consulted
and negotiated with the other countries involved and tried to reach a multilateral agreement
on turtle protection. Finally, the Appellate Body concluded that the US authorities should
bring its measure into conformity with the obligations of the US under the GATT Agreement.
In July 1999, the US department of State issued revised guidelines for the implementation of
Section 609. These guidelines set forth the measures the US would take to implement the
recommendations and the previous rulings of the DSB.
On 12 October 2000 Malaysia requested a Panel to consider whether the US had correctly
implemented the earlier ruling in the "shrimp-turtle" dispute. The panel issued its report on
15 June 2001. The Panel found that the measure adopted by the US in order to comply with
the recommendations and rulings of the DSB violates Article XI.1 of the GATT 1994 but that
"in light of the recommendations and rulings of the DSB, Section 609 of Public Law 101-162,
as implemented by the Revised Guidelines of 8 July 1999 and as applied so far by the US2001 Report on US Barriers to Trade and Investment
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authorities, is justified under Article XX of the GATT 1994 as long as the conditions stated in
the findings of this Report, in particular the ongoing serious good faith efforts to reach a
multilateral agreement, remain satisfied." The Panel noted also that "should any one of the
conditions referred to in sub-paragraph 6.1(b) above cease to be met in the future, the
recommendations of the DSB may no longer be complied with.".
The import of dairy products made from unpasteurised milk such as soft cheese, for which
there is a ready market in the US is generally prohibited, even though a number of US States
permit the production and marketing of such products. The import of fresh dairy products,
such as yoghurts, is effectively prohibited through the application of the Import Milk Act.
The import of milk protein into the US is generally permitted. The EU has a substantial
export to the US of milk protein used by especially the meat and bread industries in their
processing. The most obvious customer, the yoghurt industry is, however, not allowed to use
imported proteins, unless they originate in industries, that are Grade A approved by the US
authorities. No EU dairy is Grade A approved, and it seems impossible to become Grade A
approved. Numerous meetings with the FDA have not solved the problem.
5.4 Import Quotas
Fisheries
Each year, the US fixes the total allowable level of foreign fishing (TALFF) and accordingly
makes allocations to foreign fishing fleets. Squid fishing opportunities for EU vessels off the
East coast of the US have been gradually phased out under the terms of both the Magnuson-
Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MFCMA) and the former Governing
International Fisheries Agreement (GIFA) in favour of the development of the US domestic
fishing industry. Though mackerel migrating off the East coast is the only stock currently
identified as being in surplus in the US Exclusive Economic Zone, the US authorities have set
a zero TALFF since 1990 for this stock, following pressure from its domestic industry. The
EU believes that this line neither corresponds to the provisions and intentions of the MFCMA
or to the provisions of Article 62 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
5.5 Standards and Other Technical Requirements
Complex Regulatory System
In the US, products are increasingly being required to conform to multiple technical
regulations regarding consumer protection (including health and safety) and environmental
protection. Though in general, not intentionally discriminatory, the complexity of US
regulatory systems can represent an important structural impediment to market access. For
example, it is not uncommon that equipment for use in the workplace is subject to US
Department of Labor certification, a county authority’s electrical equipment standards,
specific regulations imposed by large municipalities, and other product safety requirements as
determined by insurance companies.
This situation is aggravated by the lack of a clear distinction between essential safety
regulations and optional requirements for quality, which is due in part to the role of some
private organisations as providers of assessment and certification in both areas. Moreover, for
products where public standards do not exist, product safety requirements can change
overnight as the product liability insurance market makes a new assessment of what will be
required for insurance purposes.
The WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) covers the rules for standards,
technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures. The TBT is applicable to all2001 Report on US Barriers to Trade and Investment
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WTO Members, and provides, inter alia, that its Members must use international standards as
the basis for their technical regulations, standards and conformity assessment procedures.
However, it provides for certain exceptions for specific, legitimate objectives, such as
protection of human health and safety, plant and animal health, and protection of the
environment, where the international standards are inadequate for the purpose. The TBT
Agreement is intended to ensure that technical regulations and conformity assessment
procedures are not more trade restrictive than required for the legitimate purpose of the
regulations concerned and the risks they are designed to cover.
The EU believes that the TBT provides an excellent base on which to tackle technical barriers
to trade at the multilateral level. It specifies stricter disciplines in many of the areas of
concern discussed below, such as the use of international standards, labelling requirements
and sub-federal standards. It provides also for further bilateral follow-up actions. In this
context, the EU and US recently concluded a Mutual Recognition Agreement and are working
towards regulatory co-operation to augment the impact of the existing sectoral dialogues.
Non-use of international standards
A particular problem in the US is the relatively low level of use, or even awareness, of
standards set by international standardising bodies. All parties to the TBT are committed to
the wider use of these standards; but although a significant number of US standards are
claimed to be “technically equivalent” to international ones, and some are indeed widely used
internationally, very few international standards are adopted directly and some US standards
are in direct contradiction to them. The EU has attempted to clarify some of these issues in
discussions in the TBT Committee in Geneva, and in particular, to establish the position of
international standards bodies in the context of the TBT, but agreement with the US has been
difficult to reach. Discussions in the WTO on conformity assessment issues are progressing
but are at an early stage.
Some illustrative cases are:
Excessive reliance on mandatory certification
Against the background of an international trend towards deregulation or the
minimising of third party intervention in the regulatory process, one problem
experienced in the US is the continued reliance on third party conformity assessment
procedures for many industrial products.
In several sectors, such as that of electrical equipment and domestic appliances,
technological development and consumer awareness have permitted public regulators
around the world to reduce the extent of pre-marketing third party testing and
certification in favour of self-certification by manufacturers backed up by post-
market surveillance and control. In the US however, third party certification in these
sectors is still mandatory (de jure and/or de facto), and as such may pose
disproportionately high costs on suppliers to the US market.
As far as IT products are concerned, since they are subject to continuous testing and
assessment in their development and production process, it should be unnecessary to
repeat such tests by a third party. Industry stresses the advantages of an appropriate
“supplier declaration of conformity”. US regulatory agencies have begun a review of
this approach, and are moving in certain instances towards manufacturer’s
declarations of conformity (PCs, VCRs, for example).
Regulatory differences at State level
There are more than 2700 State and municipal authorities in the US which require
particular safety certifications for products sold or installed within their jurisdictions.
These requirements are not always uniform or consistent with each other, or even
transparent. In particular, individual States sometimes set environmental standards
going far beyond what is provided for at Federal level. Agricultural and food imports
(particularly wines) are also often confronted with additional state-level requirements.2001 Report on US Barriers to Trade and Investment
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Acquiring the necessary information and satisfying the necessary procedures is a
major undertaking for a foreign enterprise, especially a small or medium sized one, as
at present there is no central source of information on standards and conformity
assessment. One company has estimated the volume of lost sales in the US due to the
multiplicity of standards and certification problems to be about 15% of their total
sales. The expense of certification alone was put at 5% of total sales, as was the
amount spent on product liability insurance (a far less significant factor in Europe).
The hidden costs could be much greater because the time and cost involved can be
greatly reduced simply by using US components that have already been individually
tested and certified. This is particularly the case for electrical products.
In addition, the private organisations providing quality assurance may impose the use
of certain specific product components under their own programmes that are not in
conformity with international quality assurance standards (such as the International
Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) 9000 series). In some cases (e.g. that of
telecommunications network equipment) an expensive evaluation procedure is
required which does not lead to certification and does not take account of any
additional requirements by individual buyers.
For electrical appliances Underwriter’s Laboratories (UL) have complete discretion
on the standards concerning safety certification and occasionally can make seemingly
arbitrary changes to them. UL list the products that comply with the applicable
standards, but do not approve them. This is done by a variety of competing testing
and certification agencies, some offering testing facilities in the EU.
For example, in early 1993 UL revised standard 1028 on hair clipping and shaving
appliances, amending the specifications for the on/off switch. The new UL
requirement adds nothing to the safety of these appliances, but adds considerable
costs to European manufacturers. It has also required the subsequent modification of
the related International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) standards (endorsed by
the Comité Européen de Normalisation Electrotechnique (CENELEC) [European
Electrotechnical Standards Committee]).
Non-destructive testing (NDT)
In the field of pressure equipment and indeed in an even wider area, non-destructive
testing (NDT) is an important element in ensuring product safety. A main
requirement is the certification of the personnel which is to perform the NDT.
While the ISO Standard ISO 9712 on this matter has been supported by the American
International Standards Institute (ANSI), the standard is not recognised in the context
of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) code on pressure vessels.
As the ASME code plays an important role outside the US, this fact is of very
significant relevance not only with regards to European manufacturers producing for
the US market but also European manufacturers active in other parts of the world,
even for sale of ASME compliant pressure vessels within Europe.
In practice this means, that NDT personnel in Europe need to be double-certified:
once for ISO 9712/EN 473 and once again for ASME-NDT. This is inefficient, as the
technical requirements of the NDT certification itself are in essence rather similar.
The only substantial difference is that whereas in the ISO/EN case the test is
performed by a competent third party, ASME requires the test to be performed in an
ASME proprietary fashion.
Apart from asking ANSI to ensure that the ISO 9712 is properly implemented in the
US Pressure vessels code, the European Federation of non-destructive testing
(EFNDT) has submitted to ASME in October 1999 a code case (ie. detailed wording2001 Report on US Barriers to Trade and Investment
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of the proposal) to amend the corresponding section of the ASME code. Regretfully,
no progress has been made since.
Electrical and Electronic Equipment
Trade in electrical and electronic equipment is a significant ingredient in EU-US commercial
relations. This product category amounts to 6% of total EU export to the US. European
exporters of electrical and electronic equipment and appliances face steep barriers to market
their products on the US market.
First, there is not a single US market for electrical and electronic products -- partially
divergent federal, regional, state, sectoral and even county and city technical regulations,
procurement specifications and product standards split up the market. It is not sufficient to
comply with federal regulations and obtain clearance from US Customs to market electrical
and electronic equipment in the US. The information on import conditions received by
European equipment exporters from US embassies, chambers of commerce abroad and
Customs often proves insufficient and inadequate. The de facto fragmentation of the US
market forces exporters to make expensive adaptations of their product models and type
approvals to local and sectoral requirements, undermining the economies of scale that sales
on a unified marketplace of the size of the US market would otherwise make possible.
Second, besides being divergent among themselves, the standards on electrical and electronic
products used in the US diverge most often from international IEC standards. These
international standards are applied not only in Europe but in a great majority of third countries
too. As a consequence European exporters cannot export to the US the electrical and
electronic models that they sell to the rest of the world. Moreover, the US actively seeks to
deviate countries, with which it has particularly intense trade in electrical and electronic
equipment, from the path of international standardisation. The EU would like to see a more
unambiguous commitment on the part of the US for IEC standards.
Third, the conditions and procedures applied by many States, cities and utilities to procure
electrical and electronic equipment favour local suppliers and local content. Admittedly
suppliers and equipment from other parts of the US are also discriminated against, although to
a lesser extent than foreign suppliers and equipment. At the federal level the Department of
Defence and to a lesser degree other departments also handle procurement rules that
discriminate against foreign supplies. All in all public procurement of electrical and electronic
equipment in the US does not abide by the principle of most favoured nation in respect to
countries to which the US has granted that treatment.
Finally the Annex on Electrical Safety to the EU-US Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA)
is not yet implemented correctly on the US side. The product scope of this Annex is electrical
and electronic equipment. Under the MRA European designated laboratories should certify
equipment according to US regulations. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) continues to deny European authorities the right to designate European laboratories
to operate under the Annex on Electrical Safety. The behaviour of this Agency renders void
the signature of the MRA by the US Government. The Commission is firmly committed to
step up confidence building until the MRA is applied fully in the US.
Telecommunication equipment
The Federal Ccommunications Commission (FCC) has regulated its requirements for terminal
equipment attachment (much in line with the regulatory approach used in the EU). However,
the FCC continues to require third party certification of radio transmitters that have also been
deregulated in the EU in terms of technical product requirements and approval procedures.
The FCC should therefore be encouraged to move toward a "suppliers declaration of
conformity" for radio transmitters, otherwise an unbalanced market access situation between
the EU and the US will persist.2001 Report on US Barriers to Trade and Investment
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Automotive
The American Automobile Labelling Act provides that passenger cars and other vehicles
must be labelled with, inter alia, the proportion of US and Canadian-made parts and the final
point of assembly. These requirements are intended to influence consumers to buy cars of
US-Canadian origin. There is also an obligation to indicate the origin of engines and
gearboxes that could discourage US manufacturers from importing parts from Europe.
Moreover conforming to the labelling requirement may involve the disclosure of confidential
data from non-US manufacturers.
Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE)
MTBE is used mainly as a fuel additive in petrol. There are recognised environmental risks
concerning the contamination of potable water, but these are eliminated by correct storage in
appropriate tanks. Following a contamination incidence, California introduced a ban on
MTBE. Given the size of the market for MTBE in California, this measure, which is arguably
not the correct solution to the problem, is likely to have a significant impact on international
trade. The ban is currently subject to a dispute settlement case under NAFTA by Canada.
Recreational Marine
The EU has proposed to introduce exhaust emission requirements in Directive 94/25/EC on
recreational craft. 'This has been welcomed both by EU and US industry. At the same time the
US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) seems to consider introducing other exhaust
emission values and technical requirements that are far more stringent than industry can meet.
Pharmaceuticals and cosmetics
In the US, as in Europe, a competent authority (the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
must approve a new medicinal product before it can be commercialised. However, the delays
for non-US new medicinal products appear to be longer than for US developed medicinal
products. This may be in part due to the Investigational New Drug (IND) system that allows
the FDA advanced knowledge of medicinal products tested in clinical trials in the US.
By means of an “over-the-counter” (OTC) procedure, approved active substances for many
medicinal products are put on a list (OTC-Monograph) by the FDA, so that different final
products derived from these active substances can be marketed without any application or
delay. However, the OTC monograph procedure requires that the active substance has a US
market history. This restricts market access for OTC products with lengthy marketing
experience in countries with equally sophisticated medicines regulatory systems and
particularly hampers access for plant-based (herbal) medicinal products with a long tradition
in Europe. A proposed amendment to the OTC monograph procedure was published on 17
March 1999 but does not yet allow for the acceptance of foreign clinical data for ingredients
commonly used in Europe but not in the US.
In addition, the problem of admission of European suntan lotions to the US market was first
raised with the FDA in 1991. The FDA also received a petition by European cosmetic firms
to open the simplified monograph procedure to UV-filters that had already been accepted in
the EU. The FDA did approve sunscreen products containing avobenzone in concentrations
of up to 3%; however, the final monograph covering this and other sunscreen products was
published on 21 May 1999. Should the FDA follow the monograph’s conclusions, all of the
characteristics of the label on a sunscreen product such as the size of the type, the size of the
lines, the words used, would have to be followed.
A multilateral framework for cooperation on cosmetics has been established between the EU,
US, Canada, and Japan. A work programme on regulatory cooperation has been established
with a view to align review and approval procedures and examine equivalence of technical
requirements. However, no progress has been made on the work programme for regulatory
cooperation. FDA has been reluctant to consider in a serious way even simple harmonisation
proposals put forward by the industry, eg. they have not acted on a petition submitted by the2001 Report on US Barriers to Trade and Investment
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industry several years ago to allow the use of Color Index numbers for ingredient labeling to
identify colors contained in a product despite these numbers being used in the EU and in most
of the countries around the world. The EU harmonised the majority of its labeling system
with the US nomenclature system, the major difference being the color identifications used.
The FDA should act on the petition and develop a proposal for public comment.
Textiles and Leather
Extensive product description requirements complicate exports to the US. Particular rules for
marking and labelling of retail packages to clarify the country of origin, indicate the ultimate
purchaser in the US and state the name of the country in which the article was manufactured
or produced are burdensome. Articles that are otherwise specifically exempted from
individual marking are an exception to this rule. All textile fibres imported to the US have to
be marked with the generic names and percentages by weight of the constituent fibres present
in the textile fibre product in amounts of more than 5%. Any wool products containing
woollen fibre, with the exception of carpets, rugs, mats, upholsteries and articles made more
than 20 years prior to importation, have to be clearly marked so as to satisfy the requirements
of the Wool Products Labelling Act of 1939 (with regard to information on weight and
importer). The Fur Products Labelling Act imposes similar obligations on fur products.
Agriculture and Fisheries
With respect to wine labelling, there exist procedures, both at Federal and in some cases at
State level, for the approval of labels. Despite the thoroughness of the process, names and
descriptive material that may pass off US wine as possessing characteristics or qualities of
EU wine are approved. This risks undermining the reputation of the EU product and may
displace potential sales. In addition, European exporters are geographically disadvantaged in
the sense that they have to send the original label to the competent US authorities, while the
US producers can do that with the different offices located in the main producer regions and it
can take three to four months for EU exporters to obtain authorisation.
Differences in US and EU sanitary and phytosanitary requirements can have restrictive
effects on trade. For new non-manufactured agricultural products, there are requirements for
import permits to the US. The procedures between application and the inclusion in the list of
approved products can take several years. This has been experienced also with other products
from the same area of production with the same phytosanitary risks were permitted. A variety
of EU exports to the US have encountered problems due to delays in US Customs sampling
and inspection procedures, resulting in damage to the goods and subsequent commercial
losses for the exporters. The EU does not dispute the right of the US authorities to inspect
imported goods but considers that adequate steps should be taken to deal expeditiously with
perishable goods.
The FDA’s time-consuming controls on the detection of pit fragments in imports of canned
peaches from the EU led to detention and subsequent destruction or obligatory re-export of
this product, hampering the flow of trade and negatively affecting the volume of exports.
Regulations governing the entry of apples and pears from certain Member States (Code of
Federal Regulations of 1996, Title 7, Subtitle B, Ch.III, §319-56-2r) provide for a pre-
clearance inspection programme, with the aim of guaranteeing, prior to shipment, that
consignments are free from certain specified insect pests such as the pear leaf blister moth,
and from “other insect pests that do not exist in the US or that are not widespread in the US.”
Operating in this way on the basis of an open list of unspecified pests is not a scientific
approach and is contrary to the spirit of transparency as provided for in the International Plant
Protection Convention and to the requirement of pest risk analysis and transparency laid down
in the WTO SPS Agreement. The stringent inspections and the increased costs arising from
the pre-clearance inspection programme have clearly had a negative effect on EU exports of2001 Report on US Barriers to Trade and Investment
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apples and pears to the US. Consultations with the aim of implementing the “inspection at
port of arrival” option resumed in 1996. A draft protocol for a “Schedule of Conditions”
concerning participation in an “experiment” for the export of apples and pears from the EU to
the US without phytosanitary pre-clearance by the US in the Member State of production, has
been submitted to the US. However, the consultations have not yet been conclusive.
In February 2001, the US introduced an organic standard "final rule" which will be
implemented over a two year period. While provision exists for imported products to be
recognised as organic, the EU is concerned to avoid that impediments to trade are introduced
by this new legislation.
One undue obstacle is the restriction, in the case of approved citrus consignments, of the
ports of landing to those on the North Atlantic shores. This requirement leads to unnecessary
costs of land transport into the southern and western parts of the US. If the products were
pre-cleared in the Member State of production, and moreover subject to cold-treatment during
transport, there is no phytosanitary justification for the port restriction.
The provisions on standards and certification of plants established in growing media (CFR
1996, Title 7, Subtitle B, Ch.III, §319-37-8) were last revised and effective on 3 November
1999 to permit the import into the US of certain plant genera in sterile growing media. This
has reduced the obstacles encountered by EU exports of potted plants to the US. However,
the new rule contains some requirements that are difficult for exporters to fulfil; eg. it is
impossible to satisfy certain obligations because some of the species or genera have a growth
cycle that is shorter than the waiting period required by USDA before export can take place.
Almost all sorts of plants and growing media (except soil) are permitted for import.
However, when the permitted plants are in permitted growth media the import is not
permitted, unless a special Pest Risk Assessment (PRA) has been performed by USDA's
Animal Plant and Health Inspection Service (APHIS). Twenty years ago EU producers asked
APHIS to make the PRA for 60 sorts. So far they have made only five assessments, in all
cases resulting in approval. This extremely long delay is not acceptable. APHIS agrees, but
regrets not to have the staff to speed it up. The same office has thousands of applications for
approval from all over the world for flowers and fruits and vegetables for import and export.
Export approvals have priority.
Some progress has been made on the assessment by APHIS of plants from the EU list for
Schlumbergera (Xmas cactus). However, since cacti are considered endangered species, the
Fish and Wildlife Service must give final approval, although Schlumbergera is among the
approved sorts of plants and already imported in big quantities from the EU as seedlings not
in a growing media. It can take years to get this final approval.
Resumed intensified discussions are on-going between APHIS and the Commission to assess
the plant heath risks associated with the importations of several taxa of plants in approved
APHIS growing media from the EU.
The mandatory requirement for a two-year post-entry quarantine on an importer’s premises
for hardy nursery stock is considered by the EU to be excessive. Its main purpose is
believed to be the detection of latent infections by organisms of quarantine concern.
Although this measure may be justifiable in the case of new or developing trade in specific
commodities, the EU considers this not to be the case, if the measure is required for long-term
trade on a permanent basis. This requirement should be examined in consultations with the
US.
The US introduced rules in 1997 on the import of ruminant animals and products thereof from
all European countries based on concerns about Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE).
These requirements are not scientifically based, do not follow the Organisation Internationale2001 Report on US Barriers to Trade and Investment
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Epizootique (OIE) Code, and discriminate in targeting European countries. The US make no
distinction between countries where the incidence of BSE is high or low (the latter being
countries with occasional cases).
The EU has raised its concerns at this excessive action bilaterally. During the Committee on
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures in Geneva of 10-11 July 2001, the EC announced to
intensify its efforts through bilateral discussions in the first instance with other WTO
Members. If this would not help to solve the issue, further steps might be undertaken.
Quite apart from the BSE restrictions, the US also imposes animal health restrictions on the
import of goats on the grounds of the risk of scrapie in sheep. These restrictions are not
justified because of the widespread presence of scrapie in the US sheep population.
The EU has a comprehensive set of veterinary legislation completed under the Single Market
programme, and apart from certain specific restrictions based on the relevant disease status,
there is free movement of animals within the Community. Nevertheless, the US continues to
treat the Community on an individual Member State basis for the majority of issues, thus
excluding several products of many Member States from access to the US market. It was
hoped that the entry into force on 1 August 1999 of the EU-US Veterinary Agreement would
improve the situation but this has not occurred.
The EU operates a policy of regionalisation, where restrictions are applied in zones affected by
certain animal diseases, with free movement of animals and products outside the affected zones.
An animal or product fit for movement is then considered fit for export. The principle of
regionalisation as an effective means of controlling animal disease has now been incorporated
into the US Tariff Act 1930 by the NAFTA and is part of the WTO SPS Agreement. However,
US import administrative rules concerning Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD), Rinderpest and
other relevant diseases have still not been amended to reflect this change in legislation, despite a
clear commitment in the EU-US Agreement on Application of the Third Country Meat
Directive, reached in 1992. The US published a proposed rule on “Importation of Animals and
Animal Products” covering only ruminants and swine on 18 April 1996. The EU made
substantive critical comments, and has continued to press for the US to recognise the EU’s
application of regionalisation in the context of the EU-US Veterinary Agreement.
The US, in a letter dated 24 February 1998, has committed itself to accept the EU’s
regionalisation decisions upon implementation of the EU-US Veterinary Agreement and a
provision on regionalisation was included in the EC-US Veterinary Agreement, which entered
into force in August 1999. However, the US has failed repeatedly to apply the Agreement
provision on regionalisation, most recently in the case of FMD where restrictions were imposed
on the whole of the Community, although the disease had occurred in four Member States only.
Subsequently and though US restrictions were finally lifted for EU countries with no FMD
cases, restrictions remained in place in France and Ireland, although these countries have been
free of FMD for a period longer than the 90 day period established in the framework of OIE.
Other restrictions on live animals relate to the non-recognition by the US of the EU’s
freedom from certain diseases. The US published a proposed rule on the recognition of the
disease status of certain member States for certain diseases on 14 November 1997 and
confirmed it as a final rule in 1998. The US further committed itself in March 1998 to
publish a further proposed rule covering the outstanding recognition of Member States and
diseases, notably as regards classical swine fever. The Proposed Rule - published in the
Federal Register on 25 June 1999 - together with the additional written assurances allowed
the EU-US Veterinary Equivalency Agreement to be signed on 20 July 1999. The acceptance
of regionalisation for classical swine fever (Finalisation of Proposed Rule), which was for the
EU a precondition for signing the Veterinary Agreement with the US, has never materialised.2001 Report on US Barriers to Trade and Investment
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Non-comminglement means that establishments exporting meat or meat products to the US
may not handle meat or meat products from countries that are not recognised as being free
from certain diseases of concern to the US, and that there is no mixing of meat or meat
products destined for the US with meat or meat products from such countries. The EU-US
Agreement on Application of the Third Country Meat Directive provides for an establishment
to handle both categories of meat or meat products provided that there is a separation in time
between handling them. So far, however, the US has not been willing to apply this provision
of the agreement. The EU-US Veterinary Agreement includes specific provisions for the
application of non-comminglement.
Imports into the US of uncooked meat products (sausage, ham and bacon) have been subject
to a long-standing prohibition. Following repeated approaches by the EU, US import
regulations were modified to permit the import of Parma ham, Serrano hams, Iberian hams,
Iberian pork shoulders and Iberian pork loins. However, the US still applies a prohibition on
other types of uncooked meat products (eg. San Daniele ham, German sausage, Ardennes
ham) despite the fact that meat products may come from disease free regions and that the
processing involved should render any risk negligible.
The import of egg products is allowed only under strict conditions, eg. the requirement
for continuous inspection of the production process. A system of periodic inspection
would be acceptable from a human health point of view, but continuous inspection is
superfluous and expensive, and has a negative effect on prices and competitiveness.
The import of “Low Acid Canned Food” such as fisheries products or dairy products is
subject to a detailed prior approval system and makes no provision for accepting such
products produced under “equivalent” hygiene conditions.
5.6 Government Procurement
Federal Buy America legislation
The Buy America Act (BAA), initially enacted in 1933, is the core domestic preference
statute governing US procurement. It covers a number of discriminatory measures, generally
termed Buy America restrictions, which apply to government-funded purchases. These take
several forms: some prohibit public sector bodies from purchasing goods and services from
foreign sources; some establish local content requirements, while others still extend
preferential price terms to domestic suppliers. Buy America restrictions therefore not only
directly reduce the opportunities for EU exports, but also discourage US bidders from using
European products or services. The US industry, through the court system and legislative
lobbying, ensures that Buy American preferences are enforced vigorously and maintained.
The restrictions apply to government supply and construction contracts, and require Federal
agencies to procure only US mined or produced unprocessed goods, and only manufactured
goods with at least a 50% local content. Executive Order 10582 of 1954, as amended,
expands the scope of the Buy America Act in order to allow procuring entities to set aside
procurement for small businesses and firms in labour surplus areas, and to reject foreign
bids either for national interest or national security reasons. As a result of the GATT
(subsequently WTO) Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), waivers from many Buy
America provisions have been foreseen for GPA Parties (inter alia, through the 1979 Trade
Agreements Act), including for the EU. However, the actual implementation of these
waivers may in some cases produce legal uncertainty and this may act as a barrier. In
addition, some Buy America provisions continue to significantly limit access to the US
procurement market.2001 Report on US Barriers to Trade and Investment
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One of the most obvious areas of Buy America is federal aid administered by the Department
of Transportation (DoT) under several different acts, including the Highway Administration
Act, the Urban Mass Transit Act, and the Airports Improvements Act. In accordance with
these acts, the DoT provides aid to the State and local governments for various transportation-
related procurements. The Federal government may fund 40% to 80% of the project
(depending on the nature of the grant), while the State or local government must fund the
remaining share. All purchases of goods and services related to these projects must meet
various Buy American provisions, usually domestic content requirements of 60% and, failing
that, a price penalty of up to 25%. The European Commission estimates Buy America to
affect about US$25 billion of contracts in FY2001, particularly mass transport and airport
improvement. These are precisely the sectors where EU business is very competitive. This
figure is expected to increase to about US$35 billion by 2005, taking account of budget
growth forecasts. These restrictions will negatively impact EU suppliers of products
including iron and steel and transport equipment.
National security issues
The Department of Defence (DoD) also has significant procurement expenditures that exclude
foreign suppliers of goods or services. The DoD is the largest public procurement agency
within the US government spending many tens of billions of dollars annually on supplies and
other requirements. Except as required by the Defence Supplement to the Federal
Acquisitions Regulation (DFARS), contracting officers must apply BAA requirements to
supply contracts exceeding the US$2,500 micro-purchase ceiling and to service contracts that
involve finishing of supplies when the supply portion exceeds the micro-purchase ceiling. In
March 1999, the Director of Defence Procurement reminded US defence agencies and
military departments to ensure that their contracting officers comply with requirements of the
BAA, as an audit report had revealed that some contracts had been awarded to foreign firms
in contravention of the relevant provisions.
Many procurements fall under “national security” exceptions to open procurement obligations.
Although the concept of national security can be invoked under Article XXIII of the GPA to
limit national treatment in the defence sector for foreign suppliers, the use of national security
considerations by the US has led to a disproportionate reduction in the scope of DoD supplies
covered by the GPA. While the US denies abusing the WTO national security exemption, it has
indicated a readiness, in the context of the implementation of the GPA, to disseminate more
guidance to US procurement officials for identifying which procurements are covered by the
Agreement and which by national security exemptions. It has also expressed its intention to
ensure clear and consistent identification of national security procurements, and improve the
coherence of the US Federal Supply Classification System with the international Harmonised
System. These intentions mark a first small step towards more acceptable practices.
There has been a trend towards making DoD’s other domestic preferences, apart from the BAA
preferences, less restrictive – by expanding the preference to qualifying countries. These are
countries that maintain reciprocal memoranda of understanding (MoU) with the US. Currently,
eleven EU Member States are qualifying countries. Still, an amendment to the FY1998
Defence Appropriations bill, which would have given the Secretary of Defence blanket
authority to waive the domestic preference for American speciality metals, stainless steel,
flatware, clothing, or naval components, was substantially diluted by Congress. The
compromise language only permits the Secretary of Defence to waive the restriction on a case
by case basis under certain circumstances on a limited number of products, rendering the
application of a waiver much more difficult. In addition, a bill introduced in the Senate (S.384)
in February 1999 by Commerce Committee Chairman McCain to authorise the Secretary of
Defence to waive certain domestic source or content requirements in the procurement of items
procured for the DoD failed to make any progress.
Management and operation of R&D facilities under the Department of Energy, NASA, the
National Science Foundation, or the DoD are often entrusted to private companies and2001 Report on US Barriers to Trade and Investment
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universities under “management and operating (M&O) contracts”. These contracts do not
follow the open competition procedures required under the Federal Acquisitions Regulations.
Very few M&O contracts have been subject to competitive procedures and often the
procurements done by these companies themselves follow Buy America requirements. The US
has excluded M&O contracts from its offer in the GPA. More widely, the government has
instituted a number of R&D programmes in recent years in which there is a strong preference
for US participants. Examples are the Renewable Energy Export Technology Transfer Program
and the High Speed Ground Transportation Development Program. Most of these programmes
also require BAA compliance with respect to all materials furnished pursuant to the project.
There are numerous other marginal expenditures. While not exhaustive, the following examples
of Buy America statutory programmes should be mentioned: the Balance of Payments Program;
the Merchant Marine Act of 1936; the Hazardous Materials Transportation Authorisation Act of
1994; the Amtrak Authorisation Act; Grants for Construction of Water Treatment Works;
National and Community Service Act; National Science Foundation Act of 1988 (as amended);
and the President’s National Space Policy Directive of 1990 and 1994. The latter precluded US
Government agencies from using foreign launch services (except, in the case of NASA, in
collaborative projects not involving an exchange of funds). This policy was subject to
undefined exceptions – a possibility that was never, or almost never, used.
The Commercial Space Act of 1998 on the one hand, calls on Federal agencies to buy space
launch services – rather than launch vehicles; on the other hand, it requires these services to be
procured from “US commercial providers”, subject to certain exceptions, for instance for
international collaborative efforts related to science and technology. It thus legislates the Buy
America policy contained until then in the President’s National Space Policy but opens the door
for NASA to enter into collaborative projects with foreign space agencies even if they involve
the disbursement of funds. It remains to be seen how the US Administration will interpret the
notion of “US commercial provider”. The US justified these restrictions, which initially applied
to the launching of military satellites, on national security grounds, but is now also imposed on
satellites for civilian use. These measures are part of a set of co-ordinated actions to strengthen
the US launch industry and are clearly detrimental to European launch service providers.
European launch operators remain in any case effectively barred from competing for most US
government launch contracts, which account for approximately 50% of the US satellite market.
Other indirect barriers
Apart from direct legal barriers, the complexity of procurement rules can act as an effective
indirect barrier. Suppliers based in countries that are parties of the WTO/GPA are generally
not directly excluded from the scope of the BAA and other restrictive regulations. Instead,
legislation generally foresees the granting of waivers as regards these suppliers. However,
implementation of these waivers can produce a considerable degree of legal uncertainty.
Sub-federal selective purchasing laws
At a sub-federal level, selective purchasing laws (whereby the access of companies to
contracts is severely or completely curtailed as a result of the companies’ business links with
particular third countries) continue to cause great concern. Such laws have been adopted by
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (in the case of Burma) and more than 20 cities and local
authorities, and are under consideration by a number of other sub-federal authorities. The
Supreme Court found the Massachusetts legislation unconstitutional on the grounds of
division of powers between States and the federal authorities. Whilst this removes this
particular obstacle, the wider issue of principle vis-à-vis the EU, is left unaddressed.
The EU strongly objects to these attempts to regulate the behaviour of EU companies that are
acting in full compliance with EU and Member States’ Laws.
The Commission will continue to monitor the situation in other sub-federal jurisdictions.2001 Report on US Barriers to Trade and Investment
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State Buy America legislation and restrictions
Buy America or “buy local” legislation is also rife at State level. More than half of all US
States and a large number of localities do apply some “buy local” restrictions in one form or
another. In some cases, the procurement of particular products is subject to such restrictions,
such as steel, coal, printing and cars. Affirmative action schemes favouring small business or
particular types of business (e.g. minority-owned) are also applied extensively in a large
number of States. Although 39 of the 50 States are covered by the bilateral agreement of
1994 (and 90% of total procurement by value at State level), there are still gaps in its scope
and, in some cases, concerns about its actual degree of implementation. Among the 11 states
that have not been bound in the US GPA offer, some maintain very substantial local
preferences, which have a negative impact on EU and other foreign suppliers. This is the case
of Alaska, New Mexico, South Carolina and, to a lesser extent, Ohio and Virginia. In the
case of New Jersey, State legislation also provides that for the construction of public works
projects financed by State funds, the materials used (e.g. cement) must be of domestic origin.
Even in the GPA-bound states various exemptions (i.e. for purchases of cars, coal, printing
and steel and for set aside) seriously limit the procurement opportunities open to foreigners.
Besides, all procurements by States and localities that benefit from particular types of federal
funding (e.g. in mass transit and highway projects) are subject to BAA.
Set-aside for small businesses
The Federal government actively seeks to promote the growth of small businesses in
numerous ways. It provides loans and grants, develops programmes to encourage bids from
small business, and sets aside certain procurement contracts for small business. The “set-
asides” are specifically exempted from application of the GPA. Small business set-asides
account for tens of billions in expenditures or around 30% of all federal procurement dollars.
The relevant legislation is the Small Business Act of 1953, as amended, which requires
executive agencies to place a fair proportion of their purchases with small businesses. This is
achieved through two different types of set-aside schemes: one where US Federal government
contracts are set-aside, regardless of the size of the contractor, in the event that there is a
reasonable expectation of bids from two or more eligible US small or minority businesses; the
other where all contracts below a certain threshold (currently US$2,500 to US$100,000) are
set aside for US small or minority businesses -- contracts are only released for competitive
bidding in the event that two or more eligible bidders cannot be identified. In this context,
small businesses are defined as businesses located in the US that make a significant
contribution to the domestic economy (through payment of taxes and/or use of US products,
materials, and/or labour) and are not dominant. The standard size criteria for eligibility as a
small business for goods producing industries is 500 employees or fewer. However, for some
industries (i.e. pulp, paper boxes, packaging; glass containers; transformers, switchgear and
apparatus; relays and industrial controls; miscellaneous communications equipment; search,
detection, navigation guidance systems and instruments) the employee limit is 750 and for
some others (i.e. chemicals and allied products; tyres and inner tubes; flat glass; gypsum
products; steel and steel products; computers, computer storage devices, terminals; motors
and generators; telephone and telegraph apparatus) it is 1000. For services industries,
depending on the sector, firms with total annual revenues of less than US$2.5 million to 17
million are considered to be small businesses.
In 1999, the Small Business Administration launched another programme - HUBZone - that
provides contracting benefits to small businesses located in “historically under-utilised
business zones”. The first goal of the programme is to channel at least 1% of overall federal
procurement to HUBZone small businesses, which at current federal spending levels equates
to about $2 billion. By the year 2003 that goal rises to 3%, or about $6 billion.
The notion of fair proportion means that the government-wide goal for participation by small
businesses shall be established at no less than 20% of the total value of all prime contract
awards for each fiscal year. Under normal bid procedures, there is a 12% preference for small2001 Report on US Barriers to Trade and Investment
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businesses in bid evaluation for civilian agencies (instead of the standard 6%). In the case of
the DoD, the standard 50% preference applies to all US businesses offering a US product.
An important number of States also operate particularly proactive small businesseses and
minority set-aside policies. It is estimated that in States like Texas such policies effectively
exclude foreign firms from around 20% of procurement opportunities. In Kentucky as much
as 70% is set aside for small businesses. The active promotion of small businesses is a
common concern for the EU and the US. The EU is, however, concerned that the US "set-
aside" measures and their exemption from the GPA are favouring US industry and restricting
the ability of foreign (EU and other) companies doing business in the US.
Berry Amendment
The concept of “national security” was originally used in the 1941 Defence Appropriation Act
to restrict procurement by the DoD to US sourcing. Now known as the “Berry Amendment”,
its scope has been extended to secure protection for a wide range of products only tangentially
related to national security concerns -- for example, the 1992 General Accounting Office
ruling that the purchase of fuel cells for helicopters is subject to the Berry Amendment fabric
provisions, and the withdrawal of a contract to supply oil containment booms to the US Navy
because of the same textile restrictions. A recent audit report by the Defence Department’s
Office of Inspector General concluded that for certain DoD procurements during fiscal years
1996 and 1997, about half of the solicitations and contracts examined had not incorporated or
enforced the relevant domestic sourcing requirements. In response, DoD’s procurement
director has taken steps to ensure that contracts at or above the simplified acquisition
threshold (presently US$100,000) are domestically sourced. To comply with the Buy
America provisions, contracting officers must generally add 50% to the price when evaluating
offers with non-qualifying country end products against offers with domestic end products.
In September 1996 Congress adopted an amendment that extended the initial scope of the
Berry Amendment to cover also all textile fibres and yarns used in the production of fabrics.
The result of this extension is that EU fibres and yarns can no longer be used by US
manufacturers for producing fabrics that they sell to the DoD.
Further DoD procurement restrictions are based on the National Security Act of 1947 and the
Defence Production Act of 1950, which grant authority to impose restrictions on foreign
supplies in order to preserve the domestic mobilisation base and the overall preparedness
posture of the US. At the same time, defence procurement from foreign companies is
sometimes also impeded by Buy America restrictions on federally funded programmes.
MoU undermined
In practice, all NATO countries (except Iceland), all major non-NATO allies of the US (e.g.
Australia, New Zealand) as well as Sweden, Finland and Austria have signed Memorandums
of Understanding (MoUs) with the US allowing for a waiver of the corresponding
restrictions. However, these MoUs are subject to US laws and regulations, and consequently,
other restrictions can be imposed annually by Congress through the appropriations process.
For example, US legislation allows the Administration (DoD and USTR) to rescind a waiver
if it determines that a particular ally discriminates against US products. In addition, Congress
is unilaterally overriding the MoU by imposing ad hoc Buy America requirements during the
annual budget process (e.g. in the case of anchor and mooring chains). There are also
indications that US procurement officers disregard the exemption of Buy America restrictions
for MoU countries (e.g. fuel-cells, ball and roller bearings and steel forging items).
In fact, the barriers to defence trade with the US result from a complex set of rules and
practices aiming at imposing “domestic sources restrictions” in US defence acquisition. A
partial identification of all these barriers is provided in a July 1998 report of the US General
Accounting Office that was established to justify these “domestic sources restrictions”. The
following examples illustrate the large variety of obstacles facing EU exporters to the US:2001 Report on US Barriers to Trade and Investment
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- Specific requirements to produce goods on US soil. This can take many forms, for
example as part of the DoD programme approval procedure, a requirement exists that any
major defence item must be produced on US soil, so that EU companies can only do
business by selling the licences to manufacture (e.g. Harrier Vertical Take-Off and
Landing Jet). In relation to large calibre cannons, there is legislation in Congress
requiring that they be produced in a particular US plant. Such requirements can also be
buried in the annual Defence Appropriations bill – for example, in relation to small arms,
DoD is required to justify the need to buy offshore.
- There is no grant-back given for changes made to products by the licensee (a common
element of licensing systems in the area of non-defence goods, as the original owner then
benefits from changes made).
- Foreign Comparative Tests (FCT) are carried out to assess the best product for goods not
produced in the US. Funds to carry out such tests were reduced in 1999, although the
defence budget itself was increased. Also, experience shows that, where an FCT
pinpoints a successful product, DoD seeks a licence to produce that product in the US
rather than entering into a direct supply contract with the offshore producer. The effect of
this practice is that EU suppliers look for a US production partner early in the process.
- Barriers arising from the use of the Foreign Military Sales Regulation (FMSR). The
FMSR introduces maximum foreign content threshold requirements for products exported
with FMS support. This means that US prime contractors willing to seek FMS support
are reluctant to design foreign content into their products. Instead, they prefer replacing
any foreign content by US production under licence (e.g. armoured vehicles were
obtained under licence from Austria and then sold on to Kuwait through the FMS system
– this took sales to third countries away from European companies).
- Technical data / Technology export control requirements. Non-nationals cannot take their
own foreign companies’ technical data out of the US (even if only showing around for
sales purposes) unless the US company is granted a licence to export that data – and
consequently rights over the data.
- US subsidiaries One way of circumventing the US-soil production requirements is to set
up a subsidiary in the US. However, such subsidiaries need to obtain both security
clearance and authorisation to operate. A precondition for obtaining this is that the
overseas parent company must relinquish management control of the subsidiary (US
Security Manual). These “Chinese walls” are quite systematically established, examples
are within Allison (part of Rolls-Royce) and Tracor (part of BAE Systems).
- Lack of access to bidders conferences / security clearance considerations. Foreign
nationals rarely have access to bidder conferences and other pre-contract award
procedures, because they are not granted the required security clearances at that stage of
the procurement process.
- Congressional approval of the defence budget The defence budget is approved line-by-
line and Congress regularly strikes out lines, including procurement programmes. The
effect is that defence contractors lobby Members for support for individual programmes,
offering inducements in return – sometimes ensuring that production capability will be
located in Members' districts. This represents a kind of “regional juste retour” built into
the budget approval process. As an example, the company developing a particular missile
programme ensured that 49 States benefited from that particular programme, thereby
ensuring that programme's survival in the budget.
Bearings
Congress has imposed a Buy America requirement on the procurement of ball and roller
bearings since 1988, most recently to the end of 2005. In May 1996, the Federation of
European Bearings Manufacturers’ Association (FEBMA) made a submission to DoD, in2001 Report on US Barriers to Trade and Investment
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opposition to the restriction. The 1997 DoD Authorisation Act contains the “McCain
Amendment” authorising DoD to waive Buy America requirements that would impede the
reciprocal procurement of defence items under the MOU. The EU and 21 NATO countries
asked for the effective implementation of the McCain Amendment and the termination of
discrimination vis-à-vis imports from countries with which DoD has signed defence
cooperation agreements, thus supporting FEBMA’s position. The DoD’s implementing
interim rule was published on 24 June 1997 and included bearings. However, the interim rule
notes that acquisition of non-commercial ball and roller bearings is restricted to domestic
sources by DoD Appropriations Acts. Each annual DoD Appropriations Act since 1997 has
contained a similar restriction. Therefore, Buy America restrictions remain and the McCain
Agreement waiver cannot be utilised fully for non-commercial ball and roller bearings.
Iron, Steel and Non-Ferrous Metals
The main problem for the steel sector is the imposition of local content requirements or the
preference given in works and other government procurement contracts for bids that include
locally produced steel. This practice is notably common at the sub-federal level. Many States
(such as Connecticut, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Illinois, Maryland, New York,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and West Virginia) have such requirements that also apply to
private contractors and subcontractors.
As already mentioned above, West Virginia and Ohio have recently adopted legislation that
introduces procurement restrictions on steel imports.
Telecom equipment
As a result of the failure to liberalise purchases of telecom equipment, the US decided in 1993
to impose sanctions against the EU and certain Member States under Title VII of the Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. The sanctions bar EU suppliers from bidding, inter
alia, for US Federal government contracts that are below the threshold values of the WTO
Agreement on Government Procurement. The EU responded with counter-sanctions
(Regulation 1461/93) that also bar US bidders from applying for contracts awarded by central
government agencies below the threshold values. Following the bilateral Marrakech
procurement agreement of April 1994, which liberalised around US$ 100 billion of
procurement opportunities on both sides, the EU considers that the sanctions are an
unnecessary impediment to the bilateral relationship.
Following the liberalisation of the EU telecoms sector, the US Administration has started to
investigate the possibility to mutually lift the sanctions and counter-sanctions and so there
seems to be a willingness from both the US and the EU to remove the existing sanctions.
However, no concrete decision regarding the lifting of the sanctions has been taken yet.
Central procuring agencies and e-procurement
Central purchasing agencies open to the US Federal entities have been increasingly used by
public authorities. Procuring entities are given a choice: either they follow the "traditional
system", which requires publication of a notice in the Commerce Business Daily (CBD)-Net,
or use the "new" electronic schedule system.
The EU is currently examining this system in order to verify its consistency with the GPA.
EU actions in the context of the GPA
Many of the problems experienced by EU suppliers in acceding procurement opportunities in
the US could be solved by an increase of the coverage of the GPA and by the elimination of
the exceptions introduced in the US GPA offer. Apart from other initiatives, the EU
considers that the current review of the GPA offers a good opportunity to improve the
situation.2001 Report on US Barriers to Trade and Investment
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5.7 Trade Defence Instruments
1916 Antidumping Act
The 1916 Antidumping Act prohibits the import and sale of products “at a price substantially
less than the actual market value in the principal markets of the country of their production.”
A Trade Barriers Regulation procedure on the US Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 was initiated on
25 February 1997 further to a complaint by Eurofer (European Steel Industry). The
investigations conducted by the Commission confirmed that the US authorities’ failure to
repeal the 1916 Act is in several respects not in conformity with the obligations of the US
under the WTO Agreement, the GATT 1994 and the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement.
Infringements relate notably to the type of remedies available, the lack of procedural rules and
of standing requirements, the definition and qualification of the injury concept, the criteria for
the calculation of the normal value, and the absence of the requirement to introduce products
into the commerce of another country as a prerequisite for dumping to take place.
Despite numerous offers made by the Commission services, the US authorities did not appear
willing to reach an amicable settlement. Under these circumstances, a Commission decision
to request formal WTO consultations was published in the Official Journal on 28 April 1998.
At the occasion of the consultations of 29 July 1998, the Commission reiterated its concern to
resolve the case on an amicable basis. In November 1998, a new Court action under the 1916
Act, involving steel imports from Russia and Japan by subsidiaries of EU companies, was
initiated before the Ohio District Court (in which part of the defendants made an out-of-court
settlement with the plaintiffs in early 1999). On 7 March 2000 a US printing press
manufacturer filed a complaint under the 1916 Act against German (and Japanese) producers
of large newspaper printing presses in US District Court for the Northern District of Iowa.
A Panel was established on 1 February 1999 and the report was circulated on 31 March 2000.
The Panel’s conclusions were that the 1916 Act violates Articles VI:1 and VI:2 of GATT
1994, several provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article XVI:4 of the
Agreement Establishing the WTO and recommended that the DSB request the US to bring the
1916 Act into conformity with its obligations under the WTO Agreement. The US appealed
this ruling, together with a ruling on a similar case brought by Japan. The Appellate Body
confirmed the Panel's ruling and gave the US until 26 July 2001 in which to implement the
decision. The US requested an extension to this deadline on 24 July and the EU has now
agreed that the draft bill, revoking the 1916 Act, will be adopted by 31 December 2001 or the
end of the current session of Congress, whichever is sooner.
Safeguard measure on steel wire rod
On 1 March 2000 the US introduced a tariff quota of 1.58 million net tons on imports of steel
wire rod. The quota will remain in place for three years. Imports exceeding this quota will be
subject to an additional import duty of 10% in the first year, 7.5% in the second year and 5 %
in the third year. The quota level will increase by 2% annually. Having failed on numerous
occasions to solve the issue bilaterally, a WTO Panel was requested on 23 August 2001 but
was blocked by the US, forcing a second request on 10 September 2001.
Safeguard measure on welded line pipe
On the same day, the US introduced a safeguard measure on imports of welded line pipe. The
measure consists of an additional 19% import duty, which will remain in place for three years,
but which will not apply to the first 9,000 net tons of line pipe originating in each exporting
country. The duty will be reduced to 15% in the second year and 11% in the third year. This
measure has also entered into force on 1 March 2000.
The Commission reacted to the US measures in both the steel wire rod and the welded line
pipe cases by reserving its right to suspend equivalent concessions under Article 8 of the
WTO Safeguard Agreement (SA). This Article affords exporting countries the right to obtain2001 Report on US Barriers to Trade and Investment
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trade compensation. Since the US failed to offer any trade compensation, the EU is entitled
to suspend equivalent concession. Such a suspension does not have any immediate effect in
practice, given that Article 8(3) SA stipulates that the right of suspension shall not be
exercised for the first three years that a WTO compatible safeguard measure is in effect (that
is why the US measures have been limited to such duration). However, it sends a clear signal
to the US that the EU is ready to fully use its rights under the SA and that the suspension
would immediately take effect should the US decide to extend the measures and/or should the
DSB find that the US measures do not conform to the SA.
A WTO Panel was requested on 23 August 2001 (Korea has already had a Panel, the report
being expected in mid October) but was blocked by the US, forcing second request on 10
September 2001.
Byrd Amendment
As of October 2000, US Customs authorities are obliged to give the anti-dumping duty
collected on imports directly to the complaining domestic industry. This is an illegal remedy
against dumping because industry benefits twice; once from the above measure and once from
the price increase resulting from the duty.
The EC, along with other major export countries (including Japan, Korea and Brazil)
requested a WTO Panel on 23 August 2001.
Sunset reviews on countervailing duties
In May 2000, the Commission raised with DoC and USTR the issue of sunset reviews of
countervailing duty measures against EU Member States. The Commission cited several
cases where DoC had found subsidisation to have fallen below the "de-minimis" level of 1%
set out in the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM), but had
nevertheless determined that subsidisation would continue at the rate found in the original
investigation, and had thus recommended the extension of the countervailing duties.
On 23 August 2001 the EC requested a WTO Panel having failed to solve the problem
bilaterally. However, this was blocked by the US, forcing a second request on 10 September.
Countervailing duties on pasta from Italy
On 24 July 1996, the DoC imposed antidumping and countervailing duties on pasta from
Italy. The latter contain a component designed to countervail EU export refunds granted on
cereals used in the manufacturing of pasta. This measure which could have been considered
to be in breach of item 8 of the US-EC Pasta Settlement of 1987, is subject to regular
administrative reviews, which have led to reductions in duty levels. In June 2001, the US
initiated a "sunset" review to determine whether the measure should continue or be repealed.
Agriculture and Fisheries
On 1 June 1998 the US imposed safeguard measures in the form of a quota on imports of
wheat gluten from inter alia the EU. The safeguard reduced EU exports by over 40% and
was managed in a manner designed to further disrupt trade. The protectionist nature of the US
safeguard measure was compounded by modifications to the management rules of the quotas.
The EU successfully challenged this measure before a WTO panel, which was upheld on
appeal. On 19 January 2001 the WTO Dispute Settlement Body adopted the Appellate Body
and Panel reports in the case finding the US measure to be “without legal basis”. The EU
urged the US to comply with the ruling by withdrawing the measure. While the US made no
move, the EU withdrew equivalent measures in the form of a €5 tariff on imports from the US
on corn gluten feed up to 2,730,000t.
On 1 June 2001, the US complied with its obligations and withdrew the wheat gluten quota.
As a result, the rebalancing tariff on corn gluten feed was lifted also on 1 June 2001.2001 Report on US Barriers to Trade and Investment
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Iron, Steel and Non-Ferrous Metals
In June 1998, the EU initiated a WTO dispute settlement procedure against the DoC
countervailing methodology with respect to privatisation of the EU company British Steel.
The Commission holds that the US practice of countervailing pre-privatisation subsidies
without showing whether the privatised company has obtained a benefit constitutes a
violation of the ASCM. Consultations under the DSU on this issue were held with the US in
Geneva on 29 July 1998. A panel to examine the issue was established at the DSB meeting of
17 February 1999. On 23 December 1999 the panel found in favour of the EC and
condemned the US methodology. These findings have been confirmed by the WTO
Appellate Body on 10 May 2000. The Commission expected the US to take into account the
findings of the WTO panel in several other CVD investigations involving EU companies
concerning similar issues however, this did not occur and so the EC requested a WTO Panel
on 23 August 2001. This request was blocked by the US and so a second request was made
on 10 September.
5.8 Export Restrictions
Export controls
A comprehensive system of export controls for dual-use items was established under the
Export Administration Act (EAA) of 1979 and the US Export Administration Regulations
(EAR) to prevent trade to unauthorised destinations. This system, among other things,
requires companies incorporated and operating in the EU to comply with US re-export
controls, including compliance with US prohibitions on re-exports for reasons of national
security and foreign policy. The extraterritorial nature of these controls has repeatedly been
criticised by the EU, given the fact it consists of actives member of all international export
control regimes: the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, the Missile Technology
Control Regime and the Wassenaar Arrangement (see Iran Non-Proliferation Act, chapter 3).
Serious concerns have also been raised by the 1988 US Trade Act’s amendment to Section II
of the EAA providing for sanctions against foreign companies which have violated their own
countries’ national export controls, if such violations are determined by the President to have
had a detrimental effect on US national security. The possible sanctions, which would consist
of a prohibition of contracting or procurement by US entities and the banning of imports of all
products manufactured by the foreign violator, would appear to be contrary to the GPA.
Satellites
Since 1999, the jurisdiction for export controls on commercial communications satellites as
well as parts and components and related technical data has been transferred by Congress
(National Defence Authorisation Act) from the Commerce Department to the State
Department. Goods or technologies previously listed as dual-use goods have been added to
the US munitions list, thus subjecting them to tighter controls. Exceptions were provided by
Congress calling for an expeditious treatment of export licence requests for NATO and major
non-NATO allies. However in practice this exception had no effect, with the US
Administration retaining wide latitude for imposing additional export control requirements,
also on NATO countries, as it sees fit for reasons of national security. These additional
controls, including monitoring of technical exchanges with EU firms, have lead to delays and
uncertainties in the licensing process, causing concerns about possible delays in satellite
launches and impairment of EU launch providers' ability to serve the US commercial market
(US Government launches are reserved for American providers according to the Commercial
Space Act adopted in 1998). They also impact negatively on manufacturers of satellites and
components which rely on US parts, impair the ability of EU firms to reply to US bids for
tender, and affect European insurers of launches of US satellites whose access to the technical
data required to assess the insurance risks has been hampered.2001 Report on US Barriers to Trade and Investment
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A provision in the FY2000 Consolidated Appropriations bill signed into law in November
1999 attempted to clarify the so-called “NATO/non-NATO major allies exception.” Pursuant
to this provision, a new regulatory regime for export licenses to US allies was established in
May 2000, primarily for satellite components, parts, accessories and technical data, and
entered into effect in July 2000. A separate regime was set up for commercial
communication satellites involving US allies, including those exported to French Guinea for
launch. Then-Secretary of State Albright gave assurances in a May 2000 letter to Members of
Congress that the licensing process would be expedited. However, industry continues to
express concerns that this regime does not adequately address the difficulties caused by the
transfer of jurisdiction. Two bills are pending before Congress, one which will reform the
regime controlling exports of dual-use items and technologies, including space-related ones,
and military items, and a second which will return the licensing process for satellites to the
DoC.
Encryption
With the digital age, the need has evolved for improved protection against unauthorised use in
a number of areas, including personal data, trade secrets and databases. An example where
this need is obvious is electronic commerce. In March 1997, the OECD Council adopted a
Recommendation on Guidelines for Cryptography Policy setting out principles to guide
countries in formulating policies and legislation relating to the use of cryptography.
At present, both the EU and the US operate export control regimes to limit the cross-border
movement of the strongest encryption products. On 30 December 1996, new US export
control regulations were published that transferred the licensing of commercial encryption
products from the Department of State to the Department of Commerce and mandating key
recovery until 31 December 1998. A new interim final rule was published on 14 January
2000. The rule amends the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to allow the export and
re-export of any encryption commodity or software to individuals, commercial firms and
other non-governmental end users in all destinations. It also allows exports and re-exports of
retail encryption commodities to all end users in all destinations; post export reporting
requirements are streamlined and the changes of the Wassenaar Arrangements are
incorporated (Cryptography Note). The restrictions on terrorist supporting states (Cuba, Iran,
Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan and Syria), their nationals and other sanctioned entities are
not affected by this rule. This new rule could pose potential problems such as a different
treatment for use by government bodies, Internet and telecommunications service providers
for which existing or new restrictions apply. The notion of “US subsidiaries” in Section
740.17 could create a competitive disadvantage for European firms based in the US
(especially for the development of new products) as they will have their products “technically
reviewed”. Furthermore, a “supplementary information” provision is required for foreign
companies to apply for Encryption Licensing Arrangements (ELAs) in order to obtain
treatment equivalent to that extended to foreign subsidiaries of US parent companies. The
nearly generalised introduction of the technical review of encryption products above a certain
key length in advance of sale, creates a difficulty for the European industry for cases of re-
export. The newly created rules applicable to retail encryption commodities and software, in
particular the eligibility criteria (functionality, sales volume, distribution methods, ability to
modify products and the level of support by the supplier), will probably be subject to
divergent interpretations. The effect of the Cryptography Note, as introduced in the
Wassenaar Arrangement, is reduced by the US authorities through the introduction of two
new requirements: “crypto functionality should not be modified or customised” and “the
items cannot be network infrastructure products such as high end routers or switches designed
for large volume communications”. The latter items still need to be licensed.
The practical effects of this remain to be seen. A combination of the continuing constraints
on the export of strong encryption products and on the interoperability of systems employing
such technology inhibits not only trade in encryption products but, more importantly, the
effective growth of e-commerce. Moreover, many modern encryption techniques are patented2001 Report on US Barriers to Trade and Investment
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and licenses may be required to allow sales of European products in the US. Thus, significant
barriers to international trade in encryption products without key recovery continue to exist.
5.9 Subsidies
Transparency in the area of subsidies is an obligation of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures. Up to 1998, the US only notified the WTO of a limited
number of Federal programmes, many of which were relatively small, and refused to notify
its many State-level subsidies. However, following pressure from the EU, in the form of
detailed questions and a counter-notification under Article 25.10 of the Agreement, the US
finally began to notify certain state-level subsidies in its new and full notification of 1998.
This notification was reviewed in the WTO Subsidies Committee in May 1999. The EU still
remains concerned by the lack of information on US State-level subsidies, particularly large,
ad-hoc investment incentives. The reporting of Federal subsidies has improved, although
there are still gaps as regards certain sectors, notably aerospace. The US undertook to include
non-notified subsidies, including those identified by the EU, in the next update notification.
This should have been provided in 1999. However, no update was provided at that time nor
at the subsequently promised date of September 2000, nor at the last Committee in June 2001.
Aircraft
The large civil aircraft (LCA) sector is generally subject to the WTO rules on subsidies (1979
GATT Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft), but more specific multilateral rules are
required to restrict all forms of government support and intervention for aircraft products.
The EU regrets that, in 1993, at the end of the Uruguay Round negotiations, the US blocked
at the last minute the adoption of a new Civil Aircraft Agreement supported by all other
negotiating parties. Since then, no progress has been made.
In 1992, after lengthy negotiations on government subsidies to the LCA sector, the EU and
US concluded a bilateral Agreement on Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Bilateral Agreement)
which focuses on the limitation of both direct and indirect government support. The
Agreement suffers from a divergence between the ways the US and EU interpret the indirect
support discipline and, on the European side, there is the concern that its implementation has
created an increasing imbalance of obligations. In fact, despite the very high level of US
funding for its civil aircraft industry, which since 1992 has not abated much, US
representatives have continued to argue that only a negligible fraction should be considered as
a benefit for US industry. The EU was surprised that the US did not organise in 1999 and
2000 the consultations that they were supposed to hold pursuant to the Bilateral Agreement;
these only resumed on 11 January 2001.
Despite very large public funding for NASA aeronautics R&D budgets, the US has so far
denied the existence of benefits to the US LCA industry. However, a conservative estimate of
NASA’s aeronautics budget for 1998 amounts to US$1.13 billion and according to estimates
carried out for the EU, about 70% of NASA’s aeronautics spending can be classified as
support to the US LCA industry. In FY 1998, the DoD spent about US$5 billion on R&D for
the development of aircraft and related equipment. This translates into benefits to the civil
aircraft manufacturers amounting up to US$1.17 billion. Finally, the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) has an annual aeronautics budget for research and development that
exceeds US$2 billion. One of the FAA’s stated objectives is “to foster US civil aeronautics”.
However, the US declared that only a negligible proportion of this spending has turned out to
be an identifiable (indirect) support to the US LCA industry. It should be added that Boeing
benefited in 2000 from a prohibited export subsidy (FSC) of $291 million.2001 Report on US Barriers to Trade and Investment
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According to EU estimates, for the FY 1998, US LCA manufacturers received indirect
support in the range of 5.2% to 7.4% of their commercial turnover. This is well above the 3%
limit set by the 1992 Bilateral Agreement.
Finally, it must be underlined that the US Administration has taken an active stance in favour
of the domestic aircraft industry not only through R&D government financing (subsidies), but
also by means of high-level political leverage with third countries’ airlines (inducement). In
1999, the EU first raised the issue of inducement in Israel at the GATT Committee on Trade
in Civil Aircraft and again at the 2001 bilateral LCA Agreement consultations.
The FAA has also been used to support Boeing. In January 2000, it decided to modify the
operating rules for twin-engine aircraft (ETOPS), helping the competitive position of the
twin-engine B-777 vis-à-vis the quad-engine A-340. In April 2000, the Secretary of
Transportation was granted discretionary authority not to grant landing & take-off rights
("slots") at four US airports for airlines which did not fly Boeing with the passage of the AIR-
21 FAA re-authorisation legislation. This constitutes discrimination violating three
international agreements (the EC-US 1992 Bilateral, the 1979 GATT Agreement on Civil
Aircraft and the 1994 GATT).
Shipbuilding
The signing of the OECD Shipbuilding Agreement in December 1994, which is meant to
eliminate aids in the shipbuilding sector, was a major achievement and was expected to have
a significant impact on US and all other signatories subsidy programmes and unfair practices
in the shipbuilding sector. The Agreement aims to eliminate all direct and indirect support
and to combat injurious pricing practices.
Standstill provisions on existing subsidy levels and on new measures of support before the
entry into force of the Agreement had been accepted within the Final Act of the Agreement.
In December 1995 the EC, South Korea and Norway deposited their instruments of
ratification for the Agreement and Japan in June 1996. The failure of the US to ratify it is a
matter of great concern. Opposition in the Congress originating from the naval industry did
not allow the US to ratify it and despite several attempts during the past years, no bill
concerning the implementing legislation has moved in Congress. The EU continues to
monitor the impact of the existing subsidy programmes and to request the ratification of the
OECD Agreement by the US. To date, ratification has not taken place but US industry’s
concerns about unfair competition by Korean yards could relaunch the process in the future.
From 1980 until 1994 US shipbuilders did not succeed in building for export. The domestic
market for the US Navy and the protective Jones Act (which reserves the construction of the
vessels used for coastwise traffic to US shipbuilders) provides shipyards with orders.
Production was less than 100,000 gross tonnes (gt) in 1993 while the available capacity was
250,000 gt. However, during the period 1994-1998, the deliveries grew up to 641,000 gt.
The US shipbuilding industry now represents 2% of the world market and the potential
capacity, taking into account re-conversion of military installations, is estimated at 1.1 million
gt. The Merchant Marine Act of 1936, as amended, provides for various shipbuilding
subsidies and tax deferments for projects meeting domestic-built requirements. These are
provided via the Operating Differential Subsidy (ODS), the Capital Constructions Fund
(CCF) and the Construction Reserve Fund (CRF). These measures will have to be modified
by the US Congress before the entry into force of the Shipbuilding Agreement.
In addition the US Administration introduced a new programme, the “Capability Preservation
Agreement Scheme” that was signed into law on 18 November 1997 (PL 105-85). This
scheme allows qualified shipyards to claim for reimbursement on their US Navy shipbuilding
contracts for certain costs attributable to work on their commercial shipbuilding.2001 Report on US Barriers to Trade and Investment
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The Merchant Marine Act also established under Title XI, the Guaranteed Loan Program
(formerly known as the Federal Ship Financing Guarantee Program) to assist in the
development of the US merchant marine by guaranteeing construction loans and mortgages
on US flag vessels built in the US. In 1993 the guarantee programme was extended to cover
vessels for export. During FY2000, the Maritime Administration (MARAD) approved
US$886 million worth of Title XI guaranteed loan applications for 15 vessels and barges and
2 cruise ships. As of July 2001, for FY2001 MARAD has approved US$536 million in loan
guarantees. Since fiscal year 1994, the Title XI programme has guaranteed loans for at least
426 vessels covering US$5.75 billion in loans. The OECD implementing legislation will
have to provide for the amendment of these loan guarantees in order to put them in
conformity with the rules of the 1994 Understanding on export credits for ships, which would
have entered into force together with the OECD agreement. The US industry would like to
retain this scheme that has helped to revitalise the sector.
Agriculture and Fisheries
The US operates a range of programmes designed to subsidise and/or promote exports of US
agricultural products. The US has continued to maintain an aggressive export policy for
agricultural products.
The Export Enhancement Program (EEP) allows US exporters to apply for a cash subsidy
designed to make US products competitive with exports from other countries. EEP has not
been used to any great extent in recent years, but potentially applies to products exported to
over 70 countries. The Dairy Export Incentive Program (DEIP) is also used for market
development purposes. The Market Access Program (formerly the Market Promotion
Program) offers a share of costs for promotion campaigns for agricultural products (the
majority being high value and value added) in selected export markets. The budget provides
US$ 90 million annually for fiscal years 1996-2002.
The Export Credit Guarantee Program offers US government guarantees of short-term GSM-
102 (6 months-3 years) and medium-term GSM-103 (3-10 years) private bank loans at
commercial interest rates. It is targeted at countries that need guarantees to secure financing
but show a reasonable ability to repay. The program includes a specific list of commodities
per country allocation. It has recently become the main export policy tool of USDA, with
annual allocations exceeding $5 billion and declared annual subsidy levels of over $400
million. The program has a default rate of over 10% historically, and it is characterised by
uncertainty (and lack of transparency) with respect to the implicit subsidy component
stemming from rescheduling of payments. To date no agreement has been reached on rules
governing export credit guarantees in agriculture (under Article 10.2 of the UR Agreement on
Agriculture). Negotiations were due to commence in the OECD in 1995, but were held up by
US objections for 4 years. The OECD in its 2000 report on export credits found that 88% of
trade distortions arising from export credits in the agricultural sector came from the US. The
Emerging Markets Program is funded under the Farm Bill for approximately $1 billion during
FY1996-2002 with $10 million annually for technical assistance.
The propensity of the US to use food aid to countries not suffering food shortages as a means
of surplus disposal of farm products has the effect to disturb local markets, cut out traditional
supplies and undermine local producers. The EU continues to complain about this practice
that accounts for a substantial proportion of US grain exports and is seeking disciplines on the
abuse of food aid in the WTO agricultural negotiations. The EU strongly supports the
provision of genuine food aid by the US and other countries.2001 Report on US Barriers to Trade and Investment
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6. INVESTMENT RELATED MEASURES
6.1 Direct Foreign Investment Limitations
National security considerations: Exon-Florio provisions
Section 5021 of the 1988 Trade Act, the so-called Exon-Florio amendment, authorises the
President to investigate the effects on US national security of any merger, acquisition or take-
over which could result in foreign control of legal persons engaged in interstate commerce.
This screening is carried out by the Treasury-chaired Committee on Foreign Investment in the
US (CFIUS). The length of time taken by the screening process and the legal costs involved
can act as a deterrent to foreign investment. Moreover, should the President decide that any
such transactions threaten national security – which is widely interpreted -- he can take action
to suspend or prohibit these transactions. This could include the forced divestment of assets.
There are no provisions for judicial review or for compensation in the case of divestment.
Since being introduced, the scope of Exon-Florio has been further enlarged:
· Since 1992, an Exon-Florio investigation must be made if a foreign government owned
entity engages in any merger, acquisition or take-over that gives it control of the
company. Further provisions contain a declaration of policy aimed at discouraging
acquisitions by and the award of certain contracts to such entities;
· The 1993 Defence Authorisation Act requires a report by the President to Congress on the
results of each CFIUS investigation and by including, among other factors to be
considered, “the potential effect of the proposed or pending transaction on US
international technological leadership in areas affecting US national security” -- again
blurring the line between industrial and national security policy.
The Exon-Florio provisions thus inhibit the efforts of OECD members to improve the free
flow of foreign investment and could conflict with the principles of the OECD Code of
Liberalisation of Capital Movements and the National Treatment Instruments, although the
US has notified reservations under the instruments for Exon-Florio.
While the EU understands the wish of the US to take all necessary steps to safeguard its
national security, there is continued concern that the scope of application may be carried
beyond what is necessary. In this context, the EU has drawn attention to the lack of a
definition of national security and the uncertainty as to which transactions are notifiable.
Although the US Treasury’s implementing regulations, which were published in November
1991, did provide some additional guidance on certain issues, many uncertainties remain.
Coupled with the fear of potential forced divestiture, many if not most, foreign investors have
felt obliged to give prior notification of their proposed investments. In effect a very
significant number of EU firms’ acquisitions in the US are subject to pre-screening.
Foreign ownership restrictions
With regard to foreign ownership, the US has informed the OECD of a number of additional
restrictions that it justifies “partly or wholly” on the grounds of national security. Foreign
investment is restricted in coastal and domestic shipping under the Jones Act and the US
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, which includes fishing, dredging, salvaging or supply
transport from a point in the US to an offshore drilling rig or platform on the Continental
Shelf. Foreign investors must form a US subsidiary for exploitation of deep-water ports and
for fishing in the US Exclusive Economic Zone (Commercial Fishing Industry Vessel Anti-
Reflagging Act of 1987). Under the American Fisheries Act of 1998, fishing vessel-owning
entities must be at least 75% owned and controlled by US citizens in order to document a2001 Report on US Barriers to Trade and Investment
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vessel with a fishery endorsement. Licences for cable landings are only granted to applicants
in partnership with US entities (Submarine Cable Landing Licence Act of 1921).
Under the Federal Power Act, any construction, operation or maintenance of facilities for the
development, transmission and utilisation of power on land and water over which the Federal
government has control are to be licensed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
Such licenses can be granted only to US citizens and to corporations organised under US law.
The same applies under the Geothermal Steam Act to leases for the development of
geothermal steam and associated resources on lands administered by the Secretary of the
Interior or the Department of Agriculture. Regarding the operation, transfer, receipt,
manufacture, production, acquisition and import or export of facilities which produce or use
nuclear materials, the Nuclear Energy Act requires that a licence be issued but the licence
cannot be granted to a foreign individual or a foreign-controlled corporation, even if there is
incorporation under US law.
Conditional national treatment
The principle of National Treatment -- that foreign direct investment should not be treated
less favourably than domestic enterprises in like circumstances -- is one of the pillars of the
liberalisation in the world economy and a well-established legal standard in bilateral treaties
and multilateral agreements. In OECD Member States as well as world wide, there has been
a trend to remove barriers to the entry of foreign investment and to extend the application of
national treatment by gradually removing existing restrictions. However, in the US, as in
other countries, some long-established exceptions to this principle still exist thus giving rise
to instances of Conditional National Treatment (CNT).
CNT generally relates to the treatment of foreign-owned firms that is less favourable than that
of domestic firms. The conditioning of investment may take the form of:
Reciprocity
The investment is allowed only to the extent that “comparable” or “equivalent”
opportunities are available to US firms in the home country of the investor. In some
cases, such requirements may not even be related to the sector in which the foreign
company wants to be economically active in the US (“cross-sectoral reciprocity”).
Performance requirements
Relating either to the contribution of the foreign controlled company’s activities to the US
economy and employment, or to the realisation of specified parameters of production
(volume, local content).
Public subsidies
The EU has become increasingly concerned over recent years about US legislation taking
the form of tests on whether a foreign owned company legally established in the US
meets certain conditions and requirements. CNT language is most notable in the area of
science and technology and concerns the granting of Federal subsidies for R&D or other
advantages to US-incorporated affiliates of foreign companies.
Examples of conditional national treatment are: the American Technology Pre-eminence Act
of 1991 that authorises the Advanced Technology Program, an industry-led, cost-shared R&D
programme, designed to develop high risk technologies that the private sector is unlikely to
pursue without government support; the Energy Policy Act of 1992 that authorises Federal
programmes and joint ventures between industry and government laboratories in energy-
related R&D; the National Co-operative Production Act of 1993, which extends the
favourable antitrust treatment applying to joint R&D ventures, to joint manufacturing
ventures and the Advanced Lithography Program which deals with research on semiconductor
materials and processes.2001 Report on US Barriers to Trade and Investment
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Although US subsidiaries of European firms have been able to participate in US programmes,
the fact remains that satisfying the eligibility conditions can be a more cumbersome process
for foreign-owned companies.
6.2 Tax Discrimination
Reporting requirements
The information reporting requirements of the US tax code as applied to certain foreign-
owned corporations mean that domestic and foreign companies are treated differently. These
rules apply to foreign branches and to any corporation that has at least one 25% foreign
shareholder. They require the maintenance, or the creation, of books and records relating to
transactions with related parties. The documents must be stored at a place specified by the
US tax authorities and an annual statement filed containing information about dealings with
related parties. There are stiff penalties for non-compliance with the various provisions.
These requirements are onerous. Although their purpose, the prevention of tax avoidance and
evasion, is reasonable, they are burdensome and add to the complexity for foreign-owned
corporations of doing business in the US.
"Earnings stripping" provisions
The so-called “earnings stripping” provisions in Internal Revenue Code 163j limit the tax
deductibility of interest payments made to “related parties” which are not subject to US tax,
and of interest payments on loans guaranteed by such related parties. In practice, most
“related parties” affected will be foreign corporations.
The provisions are designed to prevent foreign companies from avoiding tax by financing a
US subsidiary with a disproportionately high amount of debt as compared with equity, with
the result that profits are paid out of the US in the form of deductible interest payments rather
than as dividends out of taxed income. This objective is reasonable and in line with
internationally agreed tax policy. However, the US rules for calculating the ceiling in any
year on the amount of admissible interest uses a formula, the results of which can be
inconsistent with the internationally accepted arm’s-length principle. If, ultimately, this leads
to the disallowance of relief for the interest payable, it could have discriminatory
consequences because a tax treaty partner would not be obliged to make a corresponding
adjustment to taxable profits in the other country. The provisions relating to loans guaranteed
by related parties could also disallow the interest on a number of ordinary commercial
arrangements with US banks and provide a disincentive from raising loans with them.
State unitary income taxation
Certain US States (Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island
and West Virginia) and the District of Columbia assess State corporate income tax for
foreign-owned corporations on the basis of an arbitrarily calculated proportion of their total
world-wide profits. This proportion is calculated in such a way that a company may have to
pay tax on income arising outside the State, giving rise to double taxation.
World-wide unitary taxation
This is inconsistent with bilateral tax treaties concluded by the US at the Federal level and a
company may face heavy compliance costs in providing details of its world-wide operations.
International attention has focused mainly on California, which from 1986 has allowed
companies to elect for “water’s edge” unitary taxation. Under this method, companies are
taxed on the basis of a share of their total US (rather than world-wide) income. The 1994 US
Supreme Court ruling that California’s former world-wide unitary tax was constitutional was
not encouraging. The EU and its Member States remain concerned about unitary regimes and
will keep a watch on possible developments.2001 Report on US Barriers to Trade and Investment
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Foreign Sales Corporations
US legislation authorising so-called Foreign Sales Corporations (FSCs) (26 USC Sections
921-27) provides that, under specific conditions, certain income earned by a foreign
subsidiary of a US corporation will not be subject to US tax. The statute’s presumption as to
income allocation is questionable and gives rise to an objectionable tax benefit accruing to US
firms. The purpose of the favourable tax treatment has been to encourage the export of US
manufactured goods. The FSC is general legislation, applicable to all industrial and
agricultural sectors and was recently expanded to cover the software and military sectors.
Subsidies, which are contingent upon export performance or upon the use of domestic over
imported goods are strictly prohibited under the WTO. The FSC scheme applies exclusively
to the export of goods and these goods must have more than 50% of their market value of US
origin. Therefore, the FSC scheme provides a prohibited subsidy within the meaning of
Article 3 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM).
FSC tax exemptions cannot be justified by the aim to avoid double-taxation for US companies
established abroad as FSCs are typically established in tax havens where no income tax is
paid at all. For instance, in 1996, 91% of all FSCs were incorporated in the US Virgin
Islands, Guam and Barbados.
The EU also considers that the FSC scheme is an export subsidy within the meaning of
Article 1 of the Agreement on Agriculture. On 24 February 2000, the WTO Appellate Body
ruled in favour of the EU, as it considered that FSC exemptions amount to a prohibited export
subsidy under the ASCM as well as the Agreement on Agriculture. On 15 November 2000,
the "FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act" came into effect. This Act still
provides US firms with the subsidies and so does not comply with the Panel's rulings. The
EC requested a Panel that, in its report circulated 20 August 2001, struck down the Act. The
EU is continuing to monitor the situation closely.
Aircraft
In terms of its economic impact, Boeing declared in its 2000 financial statements that FSC tax
benefits amounted to US$291 million. This accounted for about 14% of Boeing's net
earnings for the same year (US$2.13 billion). Between 1995 and 2000, FSC benefits for
Boeing amounted to US$1 to 2 billion. In terms of market value, it has been estimated that
improved earnings due to FSC subsidies translate into advantages of US$1 to 2 billion for
Boeing’s market capitalisation, allowing it recourse to relatively cheaper capital. The FSC
system therefore grants a considerable competitive advantage to US aircraft manufacturers to
the detriment of their competitors.2001 Report on US Barriers to Trade and Investment
44
7. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
7.1 Copyright and related areas
Moral rights
Despite the unequivocal obligation contained in Article 6bis of the Berne Convention to
which the US acceded in 1989 to make “moral rights” available for authors, the US has never
introduced such rights and has repeatedly announced that it has no intention to do so in the
future. It is clear that while US authors benefit fully from moral rights in the EU, the
converse is not true, which leads to an imbalance of benefits from Berne Convention
membership to the detriment of the European side. It is noted that the US has ratified and
implemented the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) Copyright Treaty and the
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty. Adherence to these Treaties by the US requires
legislation on moral rights at least for performers.
Cross-border licensing of music works
Following a complaint under the Trade Barriers Regulation concerning obstacles to the
licensing of music works in the US, an examination procedure was initiated on 11 June 1997.
The complaint was lodged by the Irish Music Rights Organisation (IMRO) and unanimously
supported by the Groupement Européen des Sociétés d’Auteurs et de Compositeurs
(GESAC). It related to Section 110(5) of the 1976 US Copyright Act that provides for an
exemption to the author’s exclusive rights to authorise the communication of their works to
the public (“homestyle exemption”). Concretely, Section 110(5) permits the playing of
“homestyle” radios and televisions in public places (such as bars, shops, restaurants etc.)
without the payment of a royalty fee.
The investigation report, which was submitted to the TBR Committee on 3 February 1998,
confirms that Section 110(5) violates the US’s obligations under Article 11bis(1) of the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works and consequently those under
Article 9(1) of the Agreement on Trade related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPs). The report also shows that this practice has caused a serious deprivation of income
to EU right-holders as a large number of commercial establishments do not pay any royalty
fees: the report estimated the resulting royalty losses at between US$3 and 6 million a year,
representing between 10 and 20% of the annual amount of royalties obtained by EU authors
for the public performance of their works in the US. Moreover, the incomplete copyright
protection in the US has broader economic effects negatively affecting the overall position of
authors on the US market.
On the basis of these conclusions, the Commission invited the US to discuss the matter
informally. However, the US did not show a willingness to find an amicable settlement that
would be satisfactory for EU right-holders. In addition, on 6 October 1998 an amendment
was approved by the Congress (“Fairness in Music Licensing Act”) substantially widening
the scope of the homestyle exemption. As a result, the effects on Community right-holders
worsened. At the request of the EC and its Member States, at the DSB meeting of 25 May
1999, a Panel was established.2001 Report on US Barriers to Trade and Investment
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On 5 May 2000, the panel issued its final report. The panel’s main finding is that the most
important of the two subparagraphs of Section 110(5) is in breach of the US’ obligations
under the TRIPs Agreement and therefore recommended that the DSB request the US to bring
Section 110(5)(B) into conformity with its obligations under the TRIPS Agreement. The
report of the Panel was published on 15 June and was adopted by the DSB on 27 July. The
US did not appeal the report but informed the DSB that to implement the recommendations
and rulings of the DSB would require a "reasonable period of time" in which to do so under
the terms of Article 21.3 of the rules of the DSB. The matter was put to arbitration for
determination of a "reasonable period of time". The arbitrator held on 15 January 2001 that
such a period was 12 months after adoption of the Panel report (ie. 27 July 2001).
In July 2001 the EU and the US agreed to look for ways to compensate European performers
and composers for the economic losses due to the “business exemption”, until such time as
the US Copyright Act is amended. The exact amount of the compensation will be determined
by independent arbitrators.
The WTO DSB has approved the US request to postpone the deadline for implementing WTO
rulings, in order to facilitate discussions with the EU on compensation. The parties now have
until the end of the US Congressional session to negotiate a compensation deal.
7.2 Appellations of Origin and Geographical Indications
Inadequate protection
The amendment to the US trademark law (new subsection 2(a) of the Lanham Act) adopted
for the purpose of implementing Articles 23.2 and 24.5 of the TRIPs Agreement creates
grounds for refusal or cancellation of a trademark that consists of, or comprises, a
geographical indication which, when used on - or in connection with – wines or spirits,
identifies a place other than the origin of the good. It does not apply to indications that an
applicant first used in connection with wines or spirits before the TRIPs Agreement entered
into force. However, Art. 24.5 TRIPs allows continued use only of those trademarks used or
registered in good faith before 1995 or before the geographical indication is protected in its
country of origin. Thus, it will have to be closely followed whether the US complies with its
TRIPs obligations, by ensuring that a trademark used or registered in bad faith in the US can
no longer be maintained where it is identical with or similar to a geographical indication.
The European Commission and the US Government continue to discuss a broad-ranging
wine agreement, which would include improving the protection of geographical indications.
Semi-generic names
US regulations allow some EU geographical denominations of great reputation to be used by
American wine producers to designate products of US origin, many being used in word and
service marks, even for products other than wines. The most significant examples are
Burgundy, Claret, Champagne, Chablis, Chianti, Malaga, Madeira, Moselle, Port, Rhine Wine
(Hock), Sauterne, Haut Sauterne and Sherry. Despite the fact that in 1997 the D'Amato
amendment codified US regulations on the use of semi-generic wine names in the US into
Federal law, some progress was made in the context of the current bilateral negotiations
between the US and the EU where the US took a conditional commitment to phase out semi-
generic names. This commitment as well as all other areas of the protection of geographical
indications is currently under discussion between the EU and the US.
Grape names
American producers also use some of the most prestigious European geographical indications
as names of grape varieties. This could mislead consumers as to the true origin of the wines.2001 Report on US Barriers to Trade and Investment
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Spirits
With regard to spirits, an agreement was approved by the EU in February 1994 for the mutual
recognition of two US and six EU geographical indications and provides for future
discussions on the possibilities of extending their mutual recognition. For the other EU
designations, the US regulations provide a limited protection but does not prohibit their
improper use: a geographical indication when qualified by ATF as “non-generic distinctive”
may be used for spirits not originating in the place indicated but with a proviso such as
“kind”, “type”, etc. in conjunction with the true origin of the product. This appears to violate
Article 23.1 of TRIPs which expressly prevents use of a geographical indication for spirits not
originating in the place indicated, even where the product's true origin is indicated or
accompanied by an expression such as “kind”, “type”, “style”, “imitation” or the like.
Also, it should be noted that the US protects geographical indications under Article 22 TRIPs
only in as much as they may mislead consumers rather than per se. The practical approach
would appear to be insufficient in the light of the TRIPs requirement that, while granting
some leeway as to the means of protection, does not permit inadequate protection. Certain
EU agri-food producers have seen their interests affected adversely by the US approach.
7.3 Patents, Trademarks and related areas
Measures affecting imported goods
Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 provides remedies for holders of US intellectual
property rights by keeping the imported goods which are infringing such rights out of the US
(“exclusion order”) or to have them removed from the US market once they have come into
the country (“cease and desist order”). These procedures are carried out by the US
International Trade Commission (ITC) and are not available against domestic products
infringing US patents. Under the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, several
modifications have been introduced to Section 337, such as the availability of remedies in
relation to imported goods that infringe a US process patent. The GATT Panel report which
was adopted by the Contracting Parties in November 1989 concluded that Section 337 was
inconsistent with Article III:4 GATT. The provision in question accords to imported products
alleged to infringe US patent rules treatment less favourable than that accorded to like US
products. Some modifications have been made to Section 337 in the context of implementing
TRIPs. However, in its present form Section 337 does not eliminate the major GATT
inconsistencies raised by the 1989 GATT Panel. As a result, Section 337 appears to continue
to be in violation of Article III: 4 GATT and of a number of provisions contained in TRIPs.
In February 2000, the EC and its Member States held WTO consultations with the US on
Section 337 during which the US maintained the view that Section 337 was in compliance
with the provisions of the GATT and TRIPs. The EC is currently analysing the information
submitted during the consultations with a view to requesting, possibly, the establishment of a
WTO panel on this issue.
Advertising low price perfumes imitating famous European brands and thus benefiting from
the well-known reputation of the European brands is not prohibited. This practice may
violate Article 6bis Paris Convention (confusion) and/or Article 10bis Paris Convention
(unfair competition), as incorporated into the TRIPs Agreement through its Article 2.1.
Government use
Under US law (28 US Code Section 1498) a patent owner may not enjoin or recover damages
on the basis of his patent for infringements due to the manufacture or use of goods by or for
the US government authorities. This practice is apparently extremely widespread in all
government departments and it appears to be inconsistent with Article 31 of the TRIPs2001 Report on US Barriers to Trade and Investment
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Agreement that introduces a requirement to inform promptly a right holder about government
use of his patent.
First to file
European companies are faced with indirect costs resulting from the 'first-to-invent' system
for patent registrations in the US. The US patent system applies the principle of 'first-to-
invent' that is only used in the US. The rest of the world follows the principle of 'first-to-file',
fixing thereby a clearly defined moment when the priority right to a patent is established. The
'first-to-invent' principle creates several obstacles for EU and US companies trying to obtain a
patent right in the US, namely because it has a considerable economic impact on the potential
right holder. The issue has figured on top of the TBD agenda and the latter has recommended
the adoption of the 'first-to-file' approach in the US.
Section 211 of the US Omnibus Appropriations Act
Congress adopted Section 211 of the Omnibus Appropriations Act in October 1998. It
prohibits, under certain conditions, the registration or renewal of a trademark that is identical
or similar to a trademark previously owned by a confiscated Cuban entity and sets forth that
no US Court shall recognise or enforce any assertion of such rights.
In the view of the Commission and the Member States, Section 211 violates several
provisions of the TRIPs Agreement, notably on national treatment and most-favoured-nation
treatment, the protection of trademarks and enforcement. Section 211 was already applied in
a case involving a European company that was not able to defend its trademark rights before a
US court as a consequence.
At the request of the EC and its Member States of July 1999, WTO consultations were held
with the US on Section 211 in September and December 1999. These consultations, while
clarifying the respective positions, did not lead to a satisfactory resolution. Therefore, in
March 2000, the EC and its Member States decided to request the establishment of a WTO
panel.
The Panel's report was issued on 6 August 2001 and confirmed that Section 211 was in
violation of Article 42 of TRIPs by denying trademark owners access to the courts.
Furthermore, it stated expressly that Section 211 should not apply when the trademark has
been abandoned. However, there were two points where the Panel did not agree with the
EU's interpretation of the compatibility of Section 211 with WTO rules; that trade names are
not covered by TRIPs and that TRIPs does not regulate the question of the determination of
IPRs.
The EU has therefore decided to appeal the panel ruling.
Patentability of software and business methods
The patentability of software and business methods in the US has been identified by many as
a potential barrier to entry in markets.2001 Report on US Barriers to Trade and Investment
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8. SERVICES
8.1 Business Services
Professional Services
Following the conclusion of the GATS negotiations in 1993, the access of professional
service suppliers to the US has been improved since a number of nationality conditions and
in-State residence requirements have been removed.
However, despite the improvements contained in the schedule of specific commitments,
access to the US market, where licensing of professional service suppliers is generally
regulated at State level, remains unsatisfactory. This is mainly due to the lack of transparency
in -- and divergence of -- access conditions at State level, as well as the frequent absence of a
transparent regulatory regime for the operation of foreign professional service suppliers. In
addition, the Buy America provision in Section 136 (1) of the Foreign Relations
Authorisation Act for FY1990-91 gives US companies bidding for contracts to provide guard
services for US embassies a 5% price preference.
Nonetheless, the situation should improve steadily under the GATS: the Working Party on
Professional Services has agreed on disciplines applicable to accountancy services, and the
new Working Party on Domestic Regulation will continue working on the disciplines
necessary to ensure that measures relating to qualification requirements and procedures,
technical standards and licensing requirements do not constitute unnecessary barriers to trade.
In addition, negotiations on market access and on the further liberalisation of professional
services will take place as part of the next round of trade liberalisation talks.
8.2 Communication Services
In spite of the GATS Basic Telecommunications Agreement concluded in 1997 and in force
since February 1998, European and other foreign-owned firms seeking access to the US
market still face important barriers, particularly in the mobile services sector (e.g. investment
restrictions, lengthy and burdensome proceedings, protectionist attitudes in certain
congressional circles and lack of access to frequencies for 3
rd generation services) and in the
satellite services sector (e.g. lengthy proceedings, conditionality of market access, de facto
reciprocity-based procedures). The EC notes that there have been gradual improvements on a
number of issues since its last report. However, as exemplified by the protectionist bills
introduced in the Congress in 2000 and the lengthy proceedings to allow transfer of licenses,2001 Report on US Barriers to Trade and Investment
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market access is still not fully ensured and this situation is not in line with the market access
policy advocated by the US; indeed it provides a competitive advantage to the significant
number of US companies that already have access to the EU market in these fields.
WTO Basic Telecom Agreement
The negotiations on basic telecommunication services, held in the GATS framework under
the auspices of the WTO, concluded successfully on 15 February 1997. At that time, 69
governments undertook legally binding commitments on access to their telecommunications
services’ market, thereby liberalising a global market estimated to be worth approximately
US$600 billion; i.e. over 90% of total global revenues for telecommunications services. The
WTO Basic Telecom Agreement entered into force in February 1998.
The US undertook commitments on most telecommunications services (voice telephone, data,
telex, telegraph, private leased circuit services; local, domestic, long-distance and
international; using any kind of technology; etc.), but retained several restrictions. Foreign
direct investment in common carrier radio licences is limited to 20% (indirect investment
being allowed up to 100%). The US also kept a market access restriction on satellite-based
services, namely the monopoly of Comsat to link up with Intelsat and Inmarsat (US
legislation, the "ORBIT Act", removed the Comsat monopoly in 2000, see below). Late in
the negotiation, the US took an exemption to the MFN principle for one-way satellite
transmission of Direct to Home (DTH), Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS) and digital audio
services. The EU reserved its right to challenge this exemption as it applies to services which
are part of the audio-visual commitments undertaken by the US in 1994 as a result of the
Uruguay Round.
In November 1995, in the run-up to the WTO negotiations on a Basic Telecoms Agreement,
the FCC had adopted a rule on entry of foreign-affiliated carriers into the US market, adding a
new factor to the Commission’s public interest review for the purpose of granting waivers of
Section 310 restrictions on foreign indirect investment. Specifically, the FCC introduced an
“Effective Competitive Opportunity Test” (ECO-test). The FCC also issued in May 1996 a
notice of proposed rulemaking applying the ECO-test to foreign-licensed satellites. The EU
submitted objections in both proceedings. On 25 November 1997, the FCC adopted two
rulings (a general ruling on foreign participation in the US market, and a specific one on the
satellite services market entitled DISCO-II) to implement the commitments of the US in the
Basic Telecom Agreement. In these rulings the FCC replaced the ECO-test with a rebuttable
presumption that entry by carriers from WTO countries and by satellites licensed by WTO
countries is pro-competitive, but the FCC retained the unclear ‘public interest’ criteria which
can still be invoked to deny a licence to a foreign operator for various motives, such as “trade
concerns”, “foreign policy concerns” and “very high risk to competition”. Although the FCC
expressed its intention to only deny market access on this basis in exceptional circumstances
(which are not well defined) the discretion retained by the FCC remains of concern to the EU
and raises questions as to the compatibility of the FCC rules with US WTO commitments.
Radio and mobile communications
Section 310 of the Communications Act of 1934 remains basically unchanged following the
adoption of the Communications Act of 1996. It contains restrictions on the holding and
transfer of broadcast and common carrier radio communication licences: no broadcast or
common carrier (or aeronautical en route or aeronautical fixed radio station) licence shall be
granted to, or held by, foreign governments or their representatives, aliens, foreign
corporations, or corporations of which more than 20% of the capital stock is owned or voted
by a foreign entity (25% if the ownership is indirect subject to public interest waiver). The
one change brought about by the new Act was to eliminate the restriction on foreign directors
and officers.2001 Report on US Barriers to Trade and Investment
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This situation has not changed significantly through the Basic Telecom Agreement, as
limitations on direct foreign ownership of common carriers radio licences have been
explicitly retained in the US offer.
To provide telecommunications services, operators typically need to integrate radio
transmission stations, satellite earth stations and in some cases, microwave towers into their
networks. Foreign-owned US operators face additional obstacles in obtaining the licensing of
these various elements relative to US-owned firms.
Mobile communications: third generation systems
Access of third generation (3G) mobile communication systems to the US market could be
restricted due to lack of availability of frequencies in the US. This concern has arisen
following the US decision to allocate to second generation systems the frequency bands
which had been identified for third generation systems by the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU) at its World Assembly Radio-communications Conference
in 1992. These frequency bands are generally available for third generation systems in
European and in most of the other countries throughout the world, as these countries have
followed the 1992 ITU recommendation. The World Assembly Radio-communications
Conference in May 2000 (WRC-2000) identified additional spectrum for third generation
systems. In October 2000, the US Administration recognised for the first time in a
Memorandum by the US President that “Third generation wireless systems need radio
frequency spectrum on which to operate. Executive departments and agencies and the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) must cooperate with industry to identify
spectrum that can be used by third generation wireless systems, whether by reallocation,
sharing, or evolution of existing systems, by July 2001”. The USG objective is to allow FCC
to auction 3G spectrum by September 2002, though recent developments indicate that this
may take longer. The process is primarily focused on the spectrum identified at WRC-2000,
which is already being used in the US by commercial telecommunications, television,
national defence, law enforcement, air traffic control, and other services. The process has
lead already to a number of interim reports and the EU will continue to monitor it. In
particular, it is necessary to ensure that the US market is open to European and foreign
country operators which are potential new entrants in the market, as well as to provide
regulatory certainty to companies interested in investing in these new technologies in the US.
Foreign investment
The US has undertaken commitments in the framework of the Basic Telecom Agreement to
suppress restrictions to indirect investment from 1 January 1998. However, the US
Administration holds the view that it is not necessary to adopt specific legislation to abolish
such investment restrictions, since the FCC may waive these restrictions under the current law
by invoking the “public interest.” The US Administration and the FCC consider that this
waiver provision is sufficient for the FCC not to apply section 310(b)(4) to WTO Members.
This situation, however, does not provide certainty to European operators.
The FCC proceeding initiated in September 2000 by the application by Deutsche Telekom
(DT), VoiceStream and Powertel for a transfer of control of licenses from VoiceStream and
Powertel to DT in the course of DT acquisition of these mobile carriers, and concluded on
April 24, 2001 shows that foreign investment in the US still faces uncertainty and lengthy
proceedings.
The US Congress also considered during 2000 legislation that would have severely limited
the ability of foreign government-owned companies to invest in US telecommunications
companies. In particular, legislation introduced by Senator Hollings would have, if adopted,
constituted a clear violation of US commitments in the WTO on foreign investment and
would have negatively affected the interests of European companies. The EU will remain
vigilant and oppose any action, through legislation or otherwise, that would undermine the US
WTO commitments.2001 Report on US Barriers to Trade and Investment
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Satellite Communications
In the past few years, European satellite carriers have encountered serious problems in
serving the US market
1. Notably, the following cases have been brought to the Commission’s
attention: Inmarsat Ventures plc.
2, New Skies Satellites N.V.
3, and Eutelsat
4.
These cases show that proceedings by the FCC on spectrum allocation and licensing are not
always carried out in an objective, transparent, timely and non-discriminatory manner, and
raise concerns regarding their compatibility with US WTO commitments. Fortunately, the
goodwill of the companies involved has permitted positive outcomes in some cases.
In parallel to these individual cases, Congress considered for nearly two years legislation that
sought to promote a pro-competitive privatisation of Intelsat, Inmarsat, and their successor
and spin-off entities. Various bills sought to unilaterally impose the specific criteria and
timetables for the privatisation of these entities.
The "Open-market Reorganisation for the Betterment of International Telecommunications
Act" (ORBIT Act) was finally adopted by Congress and signed on 17 March 2000 by
President Clinton. The final text represents an improvement compared to earlier versions
(hopefully as a result of the démarches made by the EC and its Member States). It gives more
time, for instance, to these entities to conduct IPOs and meet the Act’s privatisation criteria,
but it still imposes conditions on entry into the US market of Intelsat, Inmarsat Ventures plc
and New Skies Satellites NV. It contains guidelines for the US administration to influence
1 Please note that “a satellite operator applying for market access to the US” means in practice that one or more US
earth station operators apply to the FCC for a license to link up with the satellite(s) of that operator. The FCC
process entails the allocation of certain frequency bands and/or orbital slots.
2 Inmarsat Ventures plc has access to the US market for maritime and international aeronautical services but access
is not yet assured for land-mobile services, although Inmarsat has been privatised since April 1999 and is now a
UK-based company. Inmarsat access to the US market should not be restricted but so far, the FCC has issued only
Special Temporary Authorisations for earth station operators to link with Inmarsat satellites. The ORBIT Act sets
'pro-competitive' criteria for US market access by Inmarsat, Intelsat and their successor and separated entities and
pursuant to this Act, on 28 June 2001, the FCC extended to the end of the year the deadline for Inmarsat's initial
public offering (IPO). While this delay is inconsistent with the general commitments in the WTO by the US,
market access for Inmarsat service providers is expected shortly. However, it is likely to contain some conditions
relating to the IPO.
3 The Netherlands-based New Skies Satellites N.V. (the privatised Intelsat spin-off) was granted market access to
the US in August 1999 to provide Fixed Satellite Services (excluding Direct to Home services) for a 3-year
duration only (compared to the standard renewable 10-year term). The FCC considered that New Skies was not
independent enough from Intelsat and that, therefore, unconditioned access to the US market could have triggered
anti-competitive risks due to potential difficulties for US companies to obtain access to foreign markets from
national regulatory authorities having a wish to protect New Skies. New Skies made since then an IPO of shares
and the results of this IPO satisfied the FCC (i.e., resulted in a “substantial dilution” of Intelsat Signatories'
ownership) and entitled US licensees accessing New Skies’ satellites to the standard 10-year earth station license,
granted by the FCC in April 2001. This case shows that the US regulation (DISCO II and its “competition
criteria”) is actually carried out in a manner that violates US commitments in the WTO (in practice, the FCC still
applies a reciprocity mechanism similar to the “ECO-test” by linking market access in the US to market access for
US operators in third countries).
4 Eutelsat (an Inter-Governmental Organisation based in France and privatised 2 July 2001) faced last year a
competing claim by a US company, Loral Skynet, to use a specific orbital location to provide Fixed Satellite
Service to and from the US, in spite of the priority rights it had acquired under the ITU process. Eutelsat and Loral
finally came to an agreement in December 1999, as it became clear that the FCC would not allow US earth station
operators to link up with Eutelsat’s satellite at the disputed orbital location in the absence of a settlement with
Loral Skynet. In particular, there is a concern that the FCC leveraged its regulatory clout to the advantage of Loral
and brought Eutelsat to the negotiating table. Absent this, and given ITU rules of filing priority, Eutelsat would
have had no incentive to engage into settlement discussions. Eutelsat's existing customers have now received FCC
authorisation to link up with its satellite. FCC also took the decision to allow future customers to automatically
link up with its satellite. This case raises questions about the compatibility of US domestic procedures with the
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the privatisation process of these companies
5 and to use that privatisation process to pursue
wider objectives
6. President Clinton, on signing this bill into law, stated that the “provisions
of S.376 could interfere with the President's constitutional authority to conduct the Nation's
foreign affairs” and that he “will therefore construe these provisions as advisory”. The Act
also includes statutory privatisation criteria that the FCC must apply in order to determine
whether to grant market access to these entities. The President thus also stated that the
Administration would continue to advise the FCC (which is an independent agency) on
matters concerning interpretation of and compliance with US WTO obligations.
However, there is serious concern in the EU that these criteria apply to no other competitor,
foreign or domestic and could lead the FCC to limit these entities’ access to the US market
and thereby reduce competition in the US market (contrary to the explicit intent of the Act to
promote competition). In that respect, the Act violates WTO obligations and if used against
EU operators' interests, the EU reserves its rights of arbitration procedures under the WTO.
Finally, the US keeps restrictions on the provision of one-way satellite transmission of Direct
to Home (DTH), Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS) and digital audio services, following the
exemption to the MFN principle taken by the US at the very last moment of the GATS
negotiations on basic telecoms services.
Universal service
The current universal service and access charge regimes in the US require further
clarification, in particular with a view to ensuring that foreign consumers are not subsidising
universal service obligations in the US.
Digital terrestrial television
The FCC mandated in 1996 an exclusive transmission standard for digital terrestrial television
in the US, known as ATSC. This decision has prevented the technology (DVB-T) developed
in Europe and being adopted in several countries around the world, from entering into the US
market. Several market players in the US have called for a review of the FCC decision
regarding, at least, the modulation system of the ATSC transmission standard so as to allow
the market to choose the technology best suited for the innovative services and applications to
be offered to consumers. Nevertheless, the FCC confirmed its decision in a January 2001
Order, following a period of comparative tests between ATSC and DVB-T modulation
systems held in the US whose procedure and results have been disputed by the DVB-T
industry. This is in clear contradiction with USG calls for technological neutrality and market
driven approaches in other sectors, such as mobile communications.
Moreover, as another example of regulatory intervention in this market, the EU notes that, in
a Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking issued in January 2001, the FCC considered
whether to require some TV sets to have the capability to receive over-the-air DTV signals in
addition to displaying the existing analog TV signals. It asked whether a gradual requirement
to include DTV reception capability in TV sets could help promote a more rapid development
of high DTV set penetration. This proposal was supported by a letter of outgoing FCC
Chairman Kennard to Senator Hollings, now Chairman of the Committee on Commerce,
Science and Transportation encouraging the US Congress to adopt legislation that would
require over time, starting from 1 January 2003, that "an apparatus designed to receive
television signals that is shipped in interstate commerce, manufactured in the United States, or
5 Mainly by calling on the US administration to achieve the bill’s objectives in international fora, by requiring that
the US administration oppose any application by these entities for additional orbital locations in the ITU and by
requiring that the US administration ensure that the US remain the administration responsible for Intelsat
notification to the ITU.
6 Specifically, the bill requires the US administration to pursue a cost-based settlement policy for international
telecommunications, and to oppose assignment by competitive bidding of orbital locations or spectrum for the
provision of international or global satellite communications services.2001 Report on US Barriers to Trade and Investment
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imported from any foreign country into the United States, for sale or resale to the public, such
apparatus be equipped to receive digital television broadcast signals". Therefore in practice,
if this approach was adopted, starting in 2003, all TV sets sold in the US, either manufactured
there or imported, would over time be required by the FCC to include the ATSC technology.
The EC will continue to monitor closely developments on this issue.
Internet domain names and cyber squatting
In the context of violations of trade marks and famous marks which have been reported to us,
the Commission welcomes the development of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) for the
Internet DNS and has, together with the US and other countries, supported the
recommendations of WIPO for an administrative dispute resolution procedure and the
implementation of the ICANN Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy.
In parallel to the adoption in August 1999 and the implementation in November 1999 by
ICANN of the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP), the US enacted the
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act in November 1999. This Act which entitles the
owner of a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office to file an in rem civil action
against a domain name, in the case of a violation of the right of the owner of a mark by a
domain name in the judicial district in which a domain name registrar or registry is located,
also allows a plaintiff to elect to recover statutory damages between $1,000 and $100,000.
The Commission supports the view that a world-wide system based on the WIPO’s
recommendations would be beneficial to the whole Internet community and should be
allowed to work through to some results and evaluation rather than being pre-empted by
national legislation. Though a thorough analysis of the Anticybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act has not been completed so far, the Commission has some reserves about the
possible impact that it could have on the use of the URDP as trade mark owners may prefer to
act under the US legislation rather than the UDRP.
The Commission is further concerned by the fact that other countries might enact further
legislation, similar or divergent, creating a situation of “patchwork” legislation world-wide
which could affect the uniform approach proposed under the WIPO and ICANN dispute
resolution scheme, in particular at the stage where the WIPO system might be extended to
address Famous Names and other categories of names dispute.
Therefore the Commission re-affirms its support to the UDRP that has been put in place by
ICANN and WIPO and endorses the outcome of the international workshop on cybersquatting
held in Australia on 31
st January and 1
st February 2000, where it was agreed that WIPO would
be requested to initiate a study and develop recommendations on further issues arising from
abusive domain names registration in relation to the protection of personal and non-protected
names within the domain name system. In this regard, WIPO has launched a co-operation
program for the administrators of ccTLDs (country code top level domains) to advise them on
intellectual property strategy and management for their domains, including dispute prevention
and resolution.
As part of this program, the "WIPO Conference on Intellectual Property Questions Relating to
the ccTLDs", that took place in Geneva in February 2001, devoted particular attention to
future trends for the country domains, the treatment of intellectual property in the ccTLDs
from the various regions of the world, and how rightholders are coping with infringements.
At the Conference, WIPO presented a comprehensive set of voluntary intellectual property
guidelines designed to assist ccTLD administrators. The Commission supports this exercise
and re-affirms its support to a uniform world wide system that would be beneficial to the
whole of the Internet community.2001 Report on US Barriers to Trade and Investment
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8.3 Financial Services
The pace of affiliations between banks and securities houses and the conduct of insurance
activities by banks began picking up prior to the recent enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act of 1999 (“GLBA”). Electronic commerce is also beginning to have an impact on the
delivery of all kinds of financial products. There is increasing convergence between the US
and EU financial sectors with a number of acquisitions of US brokerages and insurance
companies by EU firms. In this dynamic environment, it is important that EU financial firms
be given competitive opportunities comparable to those afforded US to institutions as new
laws are passed, regulations are adopted and the market evolves.
WTO Financial Services negotiations
In this regard, the European Commission is working to improve access of European financial
institutions to US markets in a number of key sectors, including the new financial activities
permitted under GLBA and reinsurance and other wholesale insurance markets.
Financial services negotiations in the framework of the GATS are particularly important. A
permanent and MFN-based agreement entered into force in March 1999 and GATS
negotiations on financial services were relaunched in Geneva in 2000 to increase regulatory
transparency in the US and other markets and ensure national treatment for EU institutions.
Banking
In 2000, following intervention by the Commission, the Federal Reserve agreed to waive the
"leverage ratio" requirement for EU banks wishing to qualify as financial holding companies
(FHCs) under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. However, concerns still remain over the extent
to which the Federal Reserve will take into account the views of the home country
supervisory authority in assessing FHC applications.
The international banking community has also voiced concern over the requirement of the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and some State banking supervisors to
maintain "asset pledges" in addition to the paid up capital the maintain in their home
country. The Commission, assisted by the International Banking Advisory Committee, is
reviewing these asset pledges requirements to see if they are appropriate.
Insurance
A remaining impediment for EU insurance companies seeking to operate in the US market is
the fragmentation of the market into 54 different jurisdictions, with different licensing,
solvency and operating requirements. Each state has its own insurance regulatory structure
and, by contrast to banking, federal law does not provide for the establishment of federally
licensed or regulated insurance companies. However, interest in establishing a federal
statutory structure for licensing and regulation of insurance is growing.
The US regulatory/supervisory structure is far behind that of the EU, and this entails heavy
compliance costs for EU companies in each of the 54 jurisdictions. The National Association
of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) is making a tentative attempt to harmonise some basic
regulatory requirements between the states, but this will be a long process. The NAIC's
recommendations are not binding, so even if state insurance commissioners agree to some
further harmonisation, implementation at state level cannot be guaranteed. Allied to the costs
involved in dealing with this outdated regulatory structure, EU companies also face direct
discrimination on a number of fronts. For example:
– not all states have "port of entry legislation". In other words, to underwrite risks in one
state, an EU insurance company must first be licensed in another state before seeking a
licence in the first state;
– some states require their insurers to buy reinsurance from state-licensed companies, before
allowing reinsurance premiums to leave the state;2001 Report on US Barriers to Trade and Investment
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– those EU companies that specialise in the US$ 9 billion "surplus lines" market (large
industrial, transport, or hard-to-place risks), such as Lloyd’s and the Paris market have to
be "white-listed" by the NAIC to operate on a cross-border basis in the US. In order to
receive approval, companies have to, inter alia, name a US attorney and lodge a trust fund
in a US bank of up to US$ 60 million. No credit is given for the fact that EU companies
are effectively regulated in the EU or for situations where the retrocession takes place to
US domestic insurers. Partly as a result of these requirements, market share of Lloyd's on
the surplus lines market has dropped from 20% to 14% over the last 10 years. Other non-
US companies share of the market has dropped from 12% to 9% over the same period.
Securities
EU securities firms may register as broker-dealers or investment advisers, and in principle
may establish both in the form of branches or subsidiaries. However, the establishment of a
branch in the US by a foreign securities firm to engage in broker-dealer activities, although
legally possible, is in fact not practicable, since registration as a broker-dealer means that the
foreign firm establishing the branch has to register and become itself subject to Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) regulation. Foreign mutual funds have not been able to make
public offerings in the US because the SEC’s conditions make it impracticable for a foreign
fund to register under the US Investment Company Act of 1940.
Concerns are arising also over the limited access for the trading screens of EU exchanges to
the US. This impedes the free flow of capital across the Atlantic.
The Commission is also encouraging the SEC to take a positive role in the creation of
international accounting standards (IAS). It will be important that IAS be acceptable for
listings of US exchanges by the 2005 date for their adoption in the EU.
8.4 Transport Services
Air Transport
Until recently, computer reservation systems (CRS) gave preference in the US to “on-line”
services (connections with the same carrier) over “interline” services (connections with other
carriers). This practice implicitly disadvantages all non-US carriers which, unlike their US
competitors, have to rely on interline connections for traffic to and from US points other than
their own gateways (behind gateway traffic). A degree of progress has been achieved with
the publication of a Final Rule in December 1997 that requires each CRS to offer one display
that lists flights without giving all on-line connections a preference over inter-line
connections. However, it is not clear that non-stop flights will be shown first in the display.
The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 prohibits foreign investors from taking more than a 49%
stake in a US carrier and restricts the holding of voting stock to 25%. This latter limitation
makes US rules on foreign ownership considerably more restrictive than relevant EU rules.
Cross border investment is an important driving force behind liberalisation. Reducing foreign
ownership restrictions would give better access for carriers to international capital, which in
turn would contribute to growth, competitive effectiveness, and the promotion of competition
and consumer benefits. In the past the US Government has advocated liberalisation of foreign
investment restrictions, but thus far no progress has been achieved in this area.
The Hatch Amendment, which was signed into law on 24 April 1996, requires the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) to apply security measures to foreign carriers, identical to
those already applied by the FAA to US airlines serving the same US airports. The FAA final
rule, implementing the law, has not been issued. Whilst the EU supports efforts to improve
aviation security, such legislation amounts to a breach of international agreements. Efforts to2001 Report on US Barriers to Trade and Investment
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improve international aviation security should be handled, as has hitherto been the case, by
multilateral negotiations.
The FAA reauthorisation bill (AIR-21) of April 2000 directs the Administrator to establish an
aircraft repair and maintenance advisory panel. It also directs the Secretary of Transportation
to request information from foreign air carriers in order to assess balance of trade issues. The
EU remains concerned that a conflict could develop with the GATS-specific commitments
undertaken by the US regarding aircraft repair and maintenance services.
Section 1117 of the Federal Aviation Act requires that, in general, transportation funded by
the US Government (passengers and cargo; mail is covered by separate legislation) must be
performed by US carriers. In the EU any obligation for government officials to use “national
flag” is considered to be anti-competitive and contrary to the Treaty.
The US and EU rules on dry leasing are broadly similar in effect. However, Article 8(3) of
Council Regulation (EEC) 2407/92 limits leases of foreign registered aircraft by EU carriers
to a short term to meet their temporary needs; or otherwise if there are exceptional
circumstances. Many EU carriers lease equipment (both with and without flight crew) from
US carriers and leasing companies.
The US rules on wet lease prevent any lease of non-US registered aircraft by US carriers. No
Community-registered aircraft with Community flight crew can thus be leased to US
companies. The US authorities subject applications for wet leases by EU carriers of third
country aircraft for use on routes to the US to a "public interest" test.
Maritime Transport
WTO negotiations on international maritime transport were suspended on 28 June 1996 with
members agreeing to observe a standstill clause pending further negotiations. Resumption of
these negotiations is an integral part of the new round on services launched in 2000. The EU
regretted that during the previous negotiations the US never tabled an offer relating to
maritime transport services and hopes that the US will endeavour to achieve a multilateral
agreement in order to create a better environment for shippers and ship-operators. The EU
believes that renewed maritime negotiations would provide an opportunity to cover all aspects
of modern door-to-door shipping, including commitments on multimodal activities and that
the most effective means to achieve the widest possible liberalisation is through the WTO.
While international maritime transport markets in the US are predominantly open, significant
restrictions remain on the use of foreign built vessels in the US coastwise trade and in relation
to access to certain international cargoes from which non-US vessels are excluded.
In particular, foreign-built (or rebuilt) vessels are prohibited from engaging in coastwise trade
either directly between two points of the US or via a foreign port. Trade with US island
territories and possessions are included in the definition of coastwise trade (Merchant Marine
Act of 1920 - the Jones Act). Moreover, the definition of vessels has been interpreted by the
US Government to cover hovercraft and inflatable rafts. These limitations on rebuilding act
as another discrimination against foreign materials: the rebuilding of a vessel of over 500
gross tonnes (gt) must be carried out within the US if it is to engage in coastwise trade. A
smaller vessel (under 500 gt) may lose its existing coastwise rights if the rebuilding abroad or
in the US with foreign materials is extensive (46 USC 83, amendments of 1956 and 1960). In
the context of the negotiations for the OECD Shipbuilding Agreement, it was agreed that the
Jones Act would be subject to a special review and monitoring procedures.
In addition, no foreign-built vessel can be documented and registered for dredging, towing or
salvaging in the US. Third countries are therefore unable to have access to the US market at a
time when part of the US fleet needs renewing and many US ports are in need of dredging.2001 Report on US Barriers to Trade and Investment
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The US has a number of statutes in place that require certain types of government-owned or
financed cargoes to be carried on US-flag commercial vessels. The impact of these measures
is significant; they deny EU competitors access to a very sizeable pool of US cargo, while
providing US ship owners with guaranteed cargoes at protected, highly remunerative rates.
The application of the measures to US public procurement contracts introduces uncertainty
for those businesses whose tenders include shipping goods to the US. Whether they are
required to ship the goods on US-flagged vessels, which charge significantly higher freight
rates than other vessels, is not known until after the award of the contract.
The relevant legislative provisions are:
- The Cargo Preference Act of 1904 requires that all items procured for or owned by the
military departments be carried exclusively on US-flag vessels.
- Public Resolution N°17, enacted in 1934, requires that 100% of any cargoes generated by
US Government loans (i.e. commodities financed by Export-Import Bank loans) be shipped
on US-flag vessels, although MARAD may grant waivers permitting up to 50% of the cargo
to be shipped on vessels of the trading partner.
- The Cargo Preference Act of 1954 requires that at least 50% of all US government-
generated cargoes subject to law be carried on privately owned US flag commercial vessels if
they are available at fair and reasonable rates.
- The Food Security Act of 1985 increases to 75% the minimum proportion of agricultural
cargoes under certain foreign assistance programs to be shipped on US-flag vessels.
- The Alaska Power Administration Sale Act of 1995, while removing the prohibition on the
export of Alaska crude oil, retained the pre-existing US flag vessel carriage requirement of
such exports.2001 Report on US Barriers to Trade and Investment
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LIST OF FREQUENTLY USED ABBREVIATIONS
ANSI American National Standards Institute
APHIS Animal Plant and Health Inspection System
ASCM Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers
ATF Bureau of Tobacco, Alcohol and Firearms
CNT Conditional National Treatment
DoC Department of Commerce
DoD Department of Defense
DoT Department of Transport
DSB WTO Dispute Settlement Body
DSU WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding
EC European Community
EPW Environmental Protection Agency
EU European Union
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FCC Federal Communications Commission
FDA Food and Drug Administration
GATS General Agreement on Trade and Services
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GPA Government Procurement Agreement
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
ITC International Trade Commission
MARAD Maritime Administration
MFN Most-favoured Nation
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NOAA National Oceanics and Atmospheric Administration
NTA New Transatlantic Agenda
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration
SEC Securities and Exchange Commission
SPS Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures
TABD Transatlantic Business Dialogue
TBT Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement
TEP Transatlantic Economic Partnership
TRIPs Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agt.
USDA US Department of Agriculture
USTR US Trade Representative
WTO World Trade Organisation